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ABSTR.\CT
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN TURKEY AND LATIN AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 1980-1995
by
Mehmet Ufuk Tutan
M.I.R. in International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. A. Giilgiin Tuna 
July, 1998, 107 pages
In this study Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) experiences of Turkey between 1980 
and 1995 are examined in comparison to the FDI experiences of the Latin American 
countries. Various FDI theories are presented, with a special emphasis on the Dependencia 
Approach. In addition, a historical background of FDI policies in the world, Latin America 
and Turkey is provided. The arranged FDI incentive systems and enacted legislations in 
Turkey are also reviewed. In the last part, some conclusions about the effects of post-1980 
FDI policies on the Turkish economy are drawn.
Key words: Foreign Direct Investment, Multinational Corporations, Dependencia Approach, 
incentives, periphery countries, core countries, Latin America.
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ÖZET
KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR AÇIDAN TÜRKİYE VE LATİN AMERIKL4 
ÜLKELERİNE 1980-1995 DÖNEMİNDE 
DOĞRUDAN YABANCI SERMAYE YATIRIMI
Mehmet Ufuk Tutan
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. A. Gülgün Tuna 
Temmuz, 1998,107 sayfa
Bu çalışmada Türkiye’nin 1980-1995 dönemindeki Doğrudan Yabancı Sermaye 
Yatırımı (DYSY) deneyimi, Latin Amerika ülkelerinin DYSY deneyimi ile karşılaştırmalı 
olarak incelenmiştir. Değişik DYSY kuramları, Bağımlılık Yaklaşımına vurgu yapılarak 
sunulmuştur. Ek olarak, dünyada, Türkiye’de ve Latin Amerika’daki DYSY politikaları 
tarihsel bir yaklaşım içerisinde verilmiştir. Türkiye’deki DYSY teşvik sistemleri ve kabul 
edilen yasalar da gözden geçirilmiştir. Çalışmanın son bölümünde, 1980 sonrası uygulanan 
DYSY politikalarının etkileri hakkında bazı sonuçlar çıkarılmıştır.
Anahtar sözcükler; Doğrudan Yabancı Sermaye Yatırımları, Çok Uluslu Şirketler,
Bağımlılık Yaklaşımı, teşvikler, çevre ülkeler, merkez ülkeler, Latin 
Amerika.
To my mother Penbe Tutan, 
‘Adalılar’ 
and
Sevda Özsoy
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CHAPTER 1 /
INTRODUCTION
After the crises of capitalism in 1973, and especially 1982, some relatively richer 
Third World countries became members of a distinct category that includes the producers of 
many diversified manufactured products. Simultaneously, the penetration of international 
capital into their social and economic structures became an integral part of the countries. 
Foreign capital, especially Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), was no longer an external 
force whose interests were represented internally by comprador industrialists and landlords. 
Capital accumulation took place in those countries by exporting mostly primary and 
manufactured goods, in exchange for high-tech goods, increasingly after 1980. In time, as 
the foreign and local capital reached a consensus about the exploitation of the domestic 
resources, the success of the industrialization and exportation was being stimulated. The
growth of foreign entries and the expansion of foreign firms into certain manufactured 
sectors worked at the expense of the small domestic firms. The expansion of domestic 
firms into certain sectors was only and only dependent on the successful collaboration with 
the foreign firms or else they could only expand on traditional sectors in which the profit 
rates were low. The banks, especially foreign ones, although they said their aim was to 
improve the local financial infrastructures, came to control certain industries and to create 
plans for liberal, private enterprise-oriented developments. The real aim of the foreign 
capital inflows from the core countries, which exploit the other countries and produce the 
latest technology and products, after 1980 is to bring old manufactured product 
technologies into the periphery countries, which are the exploited countries in the world 
economic relations, and to affect the export structure of the (periphery^) This would lead to 
the integration of the economy of the periphery with the eore by way of Balance of
Payments, and consequently increase the profit rate of the old technology exploited by the 
core. Another aim of this technology transfer is to reduce the tension between the 
developing and the developed by creating the illusion that the developing countries will also 
become developed one day.
The purpose of the current study is to analyze the FD^ experiences of Turkey 
between 1980 and 1995. To have a better understanding of Turkish experiences, Latin 
American FDl experiences are also analyzed and the two are then compared. The 
justification for this comparison lies in the similarities between the early FDI experiences of 
Turkey and Latin America, and the dissimilarities after the mid-1980s. Another region such 
as South Asia is not chosen for comparison because the transformations in this region were 
not synchronous with those of Turkey. On the other hand, only one of the Latin American 
countries might have been chosen for comparison instead of treating them as a block, 
however they were considered all together, because comparison is more meaningful if the 
data base is kept as large as possible. The pre-1980 FDl experiences of Turkey and Latin 
America have also been examined to be able to put forward the historical basis of the post- 
1980 period.
A general overview of the Dependencia Approach is given although it is not the 
core subject of the thesis. This approach has been used to criticize the FDI experiences of 
Latin America after 1980. Its basic notions have been used to present the FDI experiences 
of both regions in an objective manner.
In Chapter 11 we will provide a theoretical framework of FDl and Multinational 
Corporations, surveying alternative FDI theories. Chapter III presents a brief overview of 
the FDI policies in the world in a historical perspective, and recent trends in FDl in the
world. In Chapter IV we will be discussing the historical development of FDI, the changes 
in FDI policies after 1980, the sectoral composition and country shares of FDI, and the 
general outlook of foreign capital after 1990, in Turkey. Chapter V is devoted to the 
Turkish FDI policies after the 1980s, stating incentive legislations in detail. Chapter VI 
discusses the Latin American FDI experiences in accordance with the Dependencia 
approach, first from a historical point of view and then the post-1980 period in detail. The 
last chapter presents the summary and the conclusions of the study.
THEORIES OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
2.1 Definitions and Theoretical Frameworks
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is investment that is made to acquire a number oF 
interests in a company operating in an economy other than that of investor, the investor’s 
purpose being to have an effective voice in the management of the company. FDI can be 
divided into two primary components: portfolio investment, which is the purchase of stocks 
and bonds for the aim of obtaining a yield on the funds invested, and direct investment 
which enables the investors to participate in the management of the company in addition to 
seeking a yield on the funds invested. FDI is defined as investment that gives the investor 
effective control and is accompanied by managerial participation. Multinational 
Corporations (some prefer Transnational Corporation(TNC)) are business enterprises that 
own and manage affiliates located in two or more different countries.' “It is often 
presumed to represent a more stable flow of capital, that is linked more closely to physical 
capital, as compared to short-term investment, namely hot money”2.
There are three groups of FDI. The first group is the investor side. The second one 
is related with the conditions of host countries, and the final group is the operation of both 
home and host countries dealing with the state of the world-economy.
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Much of the FDI is generally held by Multinational Corporations (MNCs). These 
corporations are especially dealing with FDI to keep on international advantage, locational
advantages, and ownership advantages. Stemmed from these facts, FDI permits the 
investor to gain from a competitive advantage in creating, exporting and capturing private 
returns on information and new technologies.^
MNCs have control over high technology and managerial skills, and have better 
knowledge of international markets which are all to the advantage of these corporations.
' The widening technological gap between developed and developing countries may result in 
increasing FDI inflows into developing countries since MNCs could exploit monopolistic 
profits by selling high-technology. The low cost production possibility and a large, growing 
internal market are the advantages of host countries in favour of attracting FDI. 
Macroeconomic stability, for the long run, external trade, foreign exchange, FDI policies 
are also interests of foreign investors. FDI inflows are affected by the factors such as 
world-wide recession, increasing trade barriers, and regional integration.
MNCs’ objectives for implementing FDI fall into three categories: market, raw 
materials and cost reduction. The aim of the FDI in terms of market motivation is to 
possess large markets for the home country. Raw material is the traditional source of FDI 
that has extracted much of the contention for the production. The motive of cost reduction 
is related to labor cost differentials and tax reduction all of which increases competitiveness 
of home country in various markets.4
Although several theoretical and practical researches have been performed, there is 
not a clear justification on FDI through MNCs on host countries. The proponent view 
claims that FDI is beneficial for the economy of host country. There are seven points on 
which the view’s claims rest on. These are mobilization and productive use of investment 
capital, higher unemployment generated by FDI, export promotion, balance of payments
surplus, technology and managerial skills transfer and generation of taxable income. The 
opponents, on the other hand, put forward problems such as profit remittance, interest, 
licensing, know-how and capital repatriation; heavy dependence on imported materials; 
costly inappropriate technology and distorting domestic entrepreneurship and capital.^
2.2 Theories Affecting FDI and MNCs
2.2.1 Two International Theories
As knowledge and technology grow, the discipline of economies is divided into a 
branch to specialize in the researches of international trade and, in relation to it, FDI. In 
Mercantilist Theory, a country is wealthy when it has a large reserve of gold and silver 
bullion. To obtain the bullion, a favourable trade balance is obligatory and government 
should insure this via policies of support for home industry. Currently, there are 
considerable signs a reemergence of mercantilism as the determined international strategy 
of those countries which are either emerging from a historical development of the nations 
(.Japan) and from a lengthy period of underdevelopment (South Korea).^
2.2.1.1 Comparative Advantage
Ricardo who might be termed the “father” of international trade theory wrote the 
notions of the earlier mercantilism with the Theory of Comparative Advantage. Adam 
Smith had earlier initiated the Theory of Absolute Advantage (each nation should produce 
that good of which it produces the most with the least amount of input), whereas Ricardo
indicated that, even though a nation held an absolute advantage in the production of two 
goods, trade could still occur between two countries.^
2.2.1.2 Factor Endowment
In 1933, the Swedish economist, Ohlin, brought forth the theory of Factor 
Endowment, which indicates that trade takes place because nations have different 
endowments of the factors of production. Later, the Heckscher-Ohlin Theory, which states 
that a nation’s comparative cost advantage will be determined by its domestic factor supply, 
was built.8
2.2.2 Theories of FDI
Trade theory was improved by the Factor Endowments Theory. FDI had, for some 
time, dwelled on raw material extraction industries in order to sustain the needs of the home 
country. The emergence of MNCs, after World War II, investing outside of their home 
territory for other than the logic of raw materials or national enclosed markets brought the 
action of the MMCs into a serious focus and the need to examine and explain the role of the 
firm in FDI emerged.
2.2.2.1 International Product Cycle Theory
The theory emphasizes that individual business should make FDI decisions rather 
than countries. The proponent of the theory, Vernon, attempts to explain international trade 
and international investment decisions.^
According to Vernon, there are four stages in the production process. In the first 
stage, new products are invented in developed countries and are exported into the 
developing countries. In the second stage, the technology of the product becomes available 
in the developing countries. In the third stage, developing countries enter the market for the 
exportation of the product and the competition among the countries increase. In the fourth 
stage, the products are produced through MNCs in the developing countries and are 
exported to the home country.
The theory tries to put forward the behaviours of MNCs and the developing 
countries through FDI as the patterns of international trade change.
2.2.2.2 Internationalization
The theory includes monopolistic advantage theory, internationalization theory and 
transaction cost theory. Monopolistic advantage theory states that a firm accumulates 
knowledge about its products during the production process and this provides a complete 
advantage to this firm over the other firms in the relevant industries of both home country 
and host country. In the international operations, FDI is undertaken by MNCs which 
minimized uncertainties, transaction costs and risks by controlling the whole operation 
about the products. ^  *
Firms internalize imperfect markets until the cost of further internalization 
outweighs the benefits. Although internalization of markets involves costs such as
administration and communication across national boundaries, internationalization is useful
only if these costs do not exceed the benefits of internalization arising from reduction of 
time and minimization of the impact of government intervention.* ^
2.2.2.3 The Eclectic Theory of International Product
The theory seeks to provide a full explanation of the activities of MNCs. The 
approach is close to both the transaction cost and the internalization approaches, although it 
makes a separate point of ownership advantages. The theory broadens the explanations of 
FDI in transactional cost and market imperfections*3 and draws heavily on Factor 
Endowment Theory * 4.
Dunning indicates that firms will engage in FDI when three conditions are satisfied 
(1) possession of net ownership advantages, (2) ability to internalize the advantage and (3) 
being in the firm’s best interest to utilize some non-home country factor endowments. * ^
2.2.2.4 Dependencia and Neo-Imperialists
The basic argument of both theories is generally related with Marxism although 
their logic is independent of the Marxist approach because of their common roots in the 
nationalism of Third World countries.
In 1948, The United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)*^ 
and its director, Raul Prebisch, suggested planning as a program of export diversification 
and import substitution and rapid industrialization to eliminate the region’s economic
dependence on the advanced industrial countries.'^ The ECLA writers, namely 
Dependentistas, sought an explanation of the problem of underdevelopment by indicating 
the unequal exchange between Latin American countries and the Industrialized countries. ' ^
The Dependentistas claim that the reasons of the weak economic structure of the 
developing countries are the policies of the “developed market economies and centrally 
planned economies in the world” The remedies they suggest are the revolutionary 
transformation of the international order to socialist principles and equal redistribution of 
the world wealth among the countries.20
The neo-imperialists emphasize that the Developed countries use economic tools 
against the Third World. These are permanent economic dependence on monopoly capital 
in the Developed countries; integration into the Developed economic blocs; economic 
emission through FDl directly controlled by the Developed economies.^! The role of the 
state in the Developing countries is to provide cheap inputs and political stability for giant 
MNCs. economies.22 The neo-imperialist literature (Baran and Sweezy) considers the 
MNCs and their economic activity (FDI) as a new kind of surplus exploitation of the 
monopolies in the Developed economies.23 Monopolistic control on developing markets 
and infant industries, and destroyed local small enterprises gave MNCs an opportunity to 
create excess surplus which was absorbed through FDI into the home country.24 in a 
similar approach, the Dependentistas assert that FDI and technology transfer in the 
Developing countries disturbs25 the local economy by extracting local surplus, imposing 
monopolistic power on market and creating a comprador bourgeoisie.26 in other words, 
both approaches criticize FDI for its impact on national economic and political sovereignty.
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CHAPTER III
AN OUTLOOK TO FBI AND FBI POLICIES IN THE WORLD
In this chapter we will present a general outlook to FDl experiences in the world. 
Section 3.1 gives a short history of FDl in the world. Section 3.2 discusses the need for the 
FDl after 1980. Section 3.3 examines FDl in the world after the debt crisis of 1982. Section
3.4 analyzes recent trends in FDl flows in the world after the crisis. We will try to give a brief 
review of the FDl policies in the world after 1980 in order to compare with FDl experiences 
of Turkey.
3.1 Short History of FBI
In the mid-20th century, raw materials of developing countries were being exploited 
by MNCs via FDl. FDl actions were especially in agricultural sectors. During the 1960s 
and 1970s, a considerable part of FDl in manufacturing sector at the developing countries 
served domestic markets. Accompanied by the nationalization movement, national 
governments enhanced their control over natural resources in that period. After the mid- 
1970s, private banks increased their lending to developing countries. These have been some 
of the causes of the decrease of FDl share in total capital inflow to the developing countries 
in the 1970s. ^
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3.2 The Need for FDI After 1980
In the 1980s, a transformation in FDI policy frameworks took place for developing 
and developed countries. Structural adjustment programs were put into application to 
liberalize their FDI policy. Especially the 1982 world debt crisis forced most of the 
developing countries to give importance to FDI. Because, FDI was seen as a means of capital 
inflow, technology transfer, employment and export generation, and as an alternate for private 
bank lending after the world debt crisis. Normally, MNCs were important for the FDI
activities.2
3.3 FDI in the World After 1980
As mentioned previously, the credits of the private banking system decreased by the 
outburst of the international debt crisis in 1982. Simultaneously, International Money Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank (WB), the international creditors, began to extend credits. 
Nevertheless, their credits were not suitable for the developing countries due to the social 
costs, and thereupon, FDI inflows became the alternative source. However, the serious 
world-wide recession, adverse economic conditions of home countries, and new forms of 
protectionism in developed countries resulted in a decrease in FDI inflows into developing 
countries during the early 1980s.
On the contrary, the world-wide FDI outflows increased during the second half of 
1980s which ended in a strong recovery of the world economy. Especially Japan and Asian 
Newly Industrialized Countries (NlCs) invested their current account surplus into developing
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countries as FDI inflows. In that period, services became the largest sector as FDI inflows 
continued.^
At the beginning of the 1980s, the world-wide FDI had a bipolar attribute, with the 
United State of America (USA) and European Community (EC) as the source countries. As 
•lapan rose as a significant investor, this bipolar structure was transformed into a tripolar one, 
namely the Triad, after the mid-1980. The FDI inflows increased in USA markets, that is to 
say, intra-Triad FDI inflows had the largest share in total world FDI inflows. The reasons of 
the intra-Triad FDI inflows were the largest market size in the Triad, depreciation of US 
dollar, collaboration of MNCs such as making alliances with other MNCs in order to have 
control over complementary technologies.^
Since the 1950s, the share of the service sector in total FDI has been growing. By the 
late 1980s, the share of service in total FDI reached the level of 50%. In developing 
countries service investments are concentrated in trading, construction and tourism.5
3.4 Recent Trends in FDI Flows in the World
FDI is a major agent for both international integration and growth, and modernization 
of the world market. From this point of view, it is not surprising that almost 50% of the total 
foreign capital outflows go to developing countries. On the other side, foreign investments 
concentrated in the USA and EC countries have declined, since 1980, to almost 30%, which 
was 60% out of the total international investment in 1980 (See App. D, Table 7).6
FDI has become a fundamental element in complex corporate investment and 
production strategies. A global market place has been created as a result of the development
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of global communications and data transfer. The importance of foreign direct investment in 
the international economy is increasing day by day. Likewise, it is an increasingly important 
form of net long term resource flows for developing countries. Besides, FDI forms a flow of 
production assets and activities.
The year 1993 witnessed the end of the FDI recession that had predominated in 1991 
and 1992. In 1993, global outflows increased by 5% reaching $ 193 billion. However, unlike 
the USA and the United Kingdom (UK), outflows from other developed countries, mostly in 
Western Europe and Japan persisted to decline in 1993. From 1992 to 1993 the share of 
developed countries in worldwide inflows decreased from 64% to 58%.^
As opposed to the low growth of foreign direct investment flows to developed 
countries, developing countries welcomed the $ 71 billion inflow in 1993, which rose to $ 80 
billion in 1994. More than 80% of the increase in foreign direct investment which flows to 
developing countries was accounted for by one developing country, China. Excluding China, 
FDI flows into developing countries increased by 6% in 1993 and by 15% in 1994. 
Altogether, the total inflows into developing countries in 1993 alone were higher than the 
level of inflows of developed countries in 1986. In 1993, worldwide inflows reached a 
historic peak of 39%. Altogether, developing countries are becoming attractive host countries, 
mostly due to their growth performance together with ongoing liberalization of FDI policies.^
In Asia and Pacific region, investment inflows increased by 51% in 1993, reaching $ 
48 billion in that year and $ 53 billion in 1994. Asia and Pacific accounted for 68% of total 
inflows to developing countries in 1993. Investment inflows in Latin America increased by 
16% in 1993, reaching $ 19 billion in that year and $ 22 billion in 1994. These regions 
accounted for 27 % of total inflows to developing countries in 1993. Argentina was the
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largest recipient with over $ 6 billion inflows in 1993. FDl flows into Africa remained 
stagnant in 1993, at about $ 3 billion, in spite of the continuous liberalization of investment 
regimes by a number of countries. Accordingly, Africa’s portion in all inflows to developing 
countries decreased to 5% in 1993, compared with 11% between 1986 and 1990. Investment 
inilows to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe increased by 22% in 1993, reaching $ 6 
billion in that year. The growth of inflows, however, has slowed due to limbering economic 
recession in some countries of Western Europe combined with the slow or negative growth in 
these countries during their transition towards a market economy. Central and Eastern Europe 
accounted for 3% of worldwide inflows in 1993. In Western Europe, investment inflows 
decreased by 10% in 1993 to $ 73 billion approximately. Investment flows into EC was $ 110 
billion in 1990, $ 66 billion in 1992 and fell by 15% in 1993 compared with 1992. On the 
contrary, inflows into other Western European countries were almost doubled in 1993. 
Outflows also declined by 10% to $ 100 billion in 1993. Investment inflows to Japan fell to $ 
100 billion in 1993, after an amount of almost $ 3 billion in 1992. Outflows fell by 20% to $ 
14 billion. Investment inflows to other developing countries declined by 37% reaching nearly 
$ 7 billion in 1993. Australia like Japan experienced a sharp decrease in investment 
inflows.^
The developed countries were the principle sources of the recovery of the EDI flows, 
as well as beneficiaries. Investment outflows from them declined by 19% in 1991, and 6% in 
1992 whereas they increased by 4% in 1993.
From 1986 on, Turkey, as a developing country, saw an increase in investment 
inflows. Whereas the total inflow was $ 170 million in 1986, it reached $ 1.3 billion in 
1992, the peak level. After the liberalization of the foreign investment regime, privatization 
studies of state owned enterprises and had given foreign investors the opportunity to
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participate in these enterprises and decreasing the formalities in dealing with foreign 
investment applications, Turkey’s investment inflows increased to the level of $ 2 billion in 
1995. Most of the inflows are coming from France, USA, Germany, Holland, and Sweden. 
Turkey’s outward investment increased especially after the establishment of Commonwealth 
of Independent States. Turkish enterprises are generally involved with construction activities 
in these countries.
Endnotes
' There is detailed knowledge and data about FDl and foreign bank loans into Turkey in the 
late 1970s in Türkiye Ekonomisi. (7th ed. Rev.; Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1996), 141-168, 
written by Yakup Kepenek and Nurhan Yenturk.
^Ayla Yilmaz, Turkey’s Foreign Direct Investment Experience During 1980-1992 Period with 
Special Reference to Manufactured Exports (unpublished Master’s thesis. Department of 
Economics, METU, 1993), 1.
3q ECD, OECD Reviews of Foreign Direct Investment: United States, (Paris: OECD 
Publishers, 1995), 17-22; Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman, “The Surge in FDI in the 
1980s,” Foreign Direct Investment ed. Kenneth A. Froot, (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1993), 13-36.
^Yilmaz, 61-64.; OECD, 1995, 75-77.
^Yilmaz, loc. cit.. 65-66.
6QECD. International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook (Paris: OECD Publishers, 
1994), 12-17.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.; OECD, 1995, 17-29, 132-135.: UNCTAD-Trade and Development Report. 1993 (New 
York: United Nations Publications, 1993), 81-85.
9lbid., I-IV; UNCTAD-Trade and Development Report, 1994 (New York; United Nations 
Publications, 1994), 96-106: UNCTAD-Trade and Development Report. 1996 (New York: 
United Nations Publications, 1996), 34-39, 75-86:UNCTAD-Trade and Development Report. 
1997 (New York: United Nations Publications, 1997), 25-37,90-98.
'OOECD,1995, 11-29; OECD, 1994, 12-17,21-264.
18
CHAPTER rV
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EDI IN TURKEY
In this chapter we will examine FDI in Turkey between 1950 and 1995. The 
analysis extends to the pre-1980 period because the historical background of the FDI 
inflows in the post-1980 period must have been presented for a better understanding. In 
addition to that, this gives us the chance to compare the FDI policies before and after 1980. 
Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 present FDI inflows between 1950 and 1979 in Turkey. Section
4.3 and 4.4 discuss economic environments of Turkey in the 1980s. Section 4.5 and 4.6 
examine macroeconomic developments and FDI polices. Section 4.7 and 4.8 investigate 
sectoral composition of FDI and the ratios of FDI to some macroeconomic indicators. 
Section 4.9 and 4.10 present country share of FDI and FDI firms in Turkey. Section 4.11, 
4.12, 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 discuss FDI with its economic perspective, country share and sectoral 
distribution.
4.1 FDI Inflows and Sectoral Composition Between 1950 and 1979 in Turkey
Between 1950 and 1980, the main problem of Turkish economic policy was to meet 
foreign exchange needs because there was a need for sources to implement some 
development programs.' The aim of the Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI) strategy 
implemented in that period was to convert Turkey into a self-sufficient country and reduce 
the imports in the long run. However, the Turkish industry needed more foreign exchange 
resources and depended more on imports in the late 1970s. In addition to this crisis, the 
rise in oil prices hit the economy. Because of political uncertainty, the change in the
19
economic policy could not be implemented. This resulted in economic contraction in the 
1970s.,
During the 1970s, subsidies to the industrial sector increased. The increase was a 
must because of the fixed exchange rate policy. In fact, there was an increase in the exports 
but the foreign exchange problem could not be solved. The export structures of Turkish 
firms were small and middle scale and these firms could not achieve to establish an 
organization for pursuing their interests. Between 1973 and 1980, these firms had a loss in 
real values because of fixed exchange rate policy.^ But we have to consider export 
subsidies to these firms.
The relatively limited role of FDI in the development of Turkish manufacturing as a 
source of external resources shows the meagemess of the proportional net benefits that 
Turkey derived from FDI that did not take part in its manufacturing development between 
1950 and 1979.^
Before 1980, dealing with import affairs was more profitable than dealing with 
exports affairs, because imports could create rents to the businessman. Therefore, strong 
export groups could not be created in Turkey in that period.
When we look at the sectoral distribution of FDI inflows between 1950 and 1974, 
the manufacturing attracted a large share of FDI inflows. Especially, chemicals, 
transportation and vehicles, electrical machinery equipment attracted large share as a sub­
sector of the manufacturing. The service sector was the second leading sector which 
attracted FDI inflows (See App. C, Table 2).
In the period between 1950 and 1974, the Turkish manufacturing sector absorbed 
%92 of total FDI inflows. The share decreased to 86 % in 1975 and 80 % in 1979 (See
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App. C, Table 2). Transportation vehicles, chemicals, electrical machinery and electronics 
were among the major sectors which absorb the largest share of manufacturing FDI stock. 
The shares of agriculture and mining in total FDI inflows remained stable until 1979 (See 
App. C, Table 2). However, the share of services and tourism in total inflows increased 
rapidly in the 1950-79 period (See App. C, Table 2).
Between 1954 and 1979, there was a gradual increase in realized FDI inflows 
except 1974 and 1979. In 1974 and 1979, there was a decrease in FDI inflows. In other 
words, the existing FDI was withdrawn from Turkey. The amount was $ 7.7 million and $
6.4 million, respectively (See App. C, Tables 1,4,5). The reason of the decline in 1974 
could be the Cyprus war and the USA embargo. In 1979, because of increase in oil prices, 
FDI inflows decreased not only in Turkey but also all over the world. In 1964, there was a 
sudden increase in FDI inflows compared to previous years (See App. C, Table 1). The 
reason of the increase could be the spreading of democratic movement through Turkey after 
establishing a democratic constitution. This democratic climate in Turkey may have 
attracted FDI inflows.
In 1975, manufacturing sector attracted 86.29% of total FDI inflows, which was a 
very high amount when compared with the previous years (See App. C, Table 2). 
Transportation vehicles, electrical and machinery equipment, chemicals were among the 
major sub-sectors. The service sector was the second sector in that year. When we look at 
the ratio of total FDI inflows to GNP, the ratios were under 0.032 % (See App. C, Table 6). 
This data evidences the fact that Turkey could not attract huge amount of FDI inflows, in 
this year.
•
In 1979, although manufacturing sector attracted 79.37% of total FDI inflows, there 
was a decrease compared to that of 1975. The share of service sector increased in that
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period compared to that of 1975 (See App. C, Table 2). When we look at the ratio of total 
FDI inflows to Gross National Product (GNP), the ratios were under (-)0.008 percent (See 
App. C, Table 6). The American embargo and the economic crises in the world resulted in 
an outflow of the existing FDI inflows which is the reason of the negative FDI growth rate.
4.2 Source Countries as Investors Between 1950 and 1979 in Turkey
In the 1950-74 period the USA had the largest share in total FDI inflows. The USA 
was followed by respectively, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Switzerland. In 1975, 
the order was the USA, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and France, respectively. These 
countries had 50% of the total FDI inflows then. In 1979, the order changed so that France 
had the largest share in total FDI inflows. France was followed by Germany, the USA, 
Italy and Switzerland, respectively (See App. C, Tables 3,4,5). It may be concluded that 
Turkey could not succeed in attracting a large amount of foreign investment before the 
1980s. The MNCs and FDI firms in that period were oriented towards the domestic market 
and achieved to export small shares of their total sales. The reason was that these firms 
were more dependent on imports rather than domestic production and were relying on 
domestic credits rather than using external finance sources.
During the 1970s, instead of integrating itself with the world economy on the basis 
of international division of labor and mutually beneficial trade, the Turkish economy 
preferred to largely isolate itself from the forces of international competition. Thus, state 
intervention and bureaucratic interference in the economy was extreme, and the role of 
markets was almost nonexistent during 1970s. The Turkish economy could not attract 
notable FDI, up to 1980. A great deal of the FDI that came in was domestic market- 
oriented; that is to say, focused on the import-substituting industries. Turkey became
22
known as one of the riskiest host-countries in the world for foreign investors, after the mid- 
1970s/
It must be stated here that, before 1980, Turkey did not have an explicit and well- 
defined FDI policy and the bureaucracy was not willing to implement FDI policy for 
industrialization. Another problem was the lack of skilled personnel. Since in a highly 
protected domestic market it was more reasonable to produce for the domestic market, 
MNCs preferred to produce for internal markets rather than exports and chose to borrow 
credits from domestic financial markets rather than looking for external credits, considering 
the given exchange rates regime and credit markets.^ We have observed that after mid- 
1970s the leadership of source countries of FDI inflows shifted from the USA to the 
European countries.
4.3 Late 1970s and Early 1980s
Until 1980, the developing countries’ -including Turkey- main source of external 
borrowing was the private banking system. However, the debt crisis in 1982 and in 
addition, the lack of official lending forced these countries to perceive FDI as a source of 
foreign exchange. This condition created a new mentality based on globalisation, 
liberalization, and openness to the world-economy in order to support the “new FDI 
policy’’.^
After entering the foreign exchange crisis in 1979, Turkey implemented 
stabilization and structural adjustment policies. Yet, in those years, the existence of a 
liberal legal framework did not guarantee its liberal implementation. Three factors resulted 
in its being implemented in a limited manner. The first one was the contradiction between 
overall economic policies and the new FDI policy. The second factor was the negative
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attitude of the bureaucrats. And finally the third one was Law 6224 which was an obstacle 
for the implementation process.
Turkey insisted on ISI strategy, until the late 1970s. The gap between saving and 
investment was tried to be closed by foreign saving in the form of government to 
government or international economic institutions to government lending. Private and 
official lending opportunities diminished, due to the foreign exchange crisis. Consequently, 
Turkey accepted to implement IMF and WB proposals in order to integrate the economy 
into the world economy and to attract foreign exchange. Turkey made three stand-by 
agreements with the IMF during 1980-83. The WB supplied five structural adjustment 
loans in the 1980-84 period.’
4.4 Economic Environment of Turkey in the 1980s
Among the OECD countries, the Turkish economy is one of the most dynamic. 
During the 1980s, Turkey’s GNP increased almost 2 percent faster than the OECD average 
reaching yearly average of 5 percent growth rate.*
The main reasons behind this high growth rate were economic policies implemented 
in this period. These policies were trade and financial liberalization, development of capital 
markets, major public investment in telecommunications, roads and other basic 
infrastructures, promotion of foreign investment, and external debts.
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4.4.1 Turkey’s New Internationalization
In the 1980-1990 period, Turkish exports increased at an average compound rates of 
16% whereas imports increased at a rate of 11% per year. In 1990, Turkish imports 
amounted to $ 22 billion and exports to $ 13 billion, which consisted 33% of GNP. In mid- 
1980s only 35% of the traded goods were industrial products, this rate increased to 80% of 
total exports in mid-1990s. Geographically considerations show that nearly 50% of exports 
and 40% of imports are with the EC such that no one country was accounting for more than 
25% of either exports or imports.^
4.4.2 Resource Base
In the late 1980s the sectoral composition of the Turkish economy was typical of a 
newly industrialized country. Agriculture employed almost 50% of the total civilian labor 
force while its contribution to GDP was less than 18%, which is 26% for industry and 56% 
for services.
• Agriculture
Among Turkey’s products there is a wide range of temperate and Mediterranean 
products and all together they added up to 18% of GDP during the 1980s. Moreover, 
agriculture is the source of raw materials for many important industrial activities and 
therefore exporters rely on agriculture. After 1980, laws were enacted to encourage EDI to 
agro-industry for export namely seeds, production of fodder plants, production of fresh 
fruits and vegetables."
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The following table shows Turkey’s international ranking in the total output of 
selected key products.
Table 4.1: Turkey’s Ranking in World and European Output, 1987
Product World Europe Product World Europe
Barley 8 5 Olives 4 4
Cigarettes 18 10 Pistachios 2 1
Citrus 8 3 Sugar 13 3
Cotton 7 1 Sugar Beet 7 6
Figs 1 1 Sunflower 7 4
Grapes 6 4 Tea 6 1
Hazelnuts 1 1 Tobacco 6 1
Lentils 1 1 Wheat 17 2
Maize 25 8
Source; YASED and Citibank, An Investment Guide to Turkev. (Istanbul, Citibank,
1992),8.
This sector was always powerful in Turkey and a further boost is coming from the 
progressive implementation of a development project in Southeast Anatolia on the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers. This multi-purpose river based project aims to increase 
Turkey’s irrigatable land by an area over half the size of Belgium while almost doubling the 
electrical energy output.'^ As a matter of fact, the success of the project depends on the 
realization of land reform and equal income distribution in Southeastern Anatolia.
• Mining
Although Turkey has an important mineral resource base, further exploration and 
investment is needed for the country’s full potential to be realized. This sector has been
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opened to FDI after January 1980. Especially, chromate, copper, magnesite and coal 
benefited from FDI.'^ In the past, mining activity was dominated by the public sector, but 
together with the liberalization policy a new mining law was enacted in 1985 and the 
restrictions on the private investment in the sector were reduced.'“*
• Manufacturing
Turkey’s manufacturing base is diverse, with industrial sectors varying from 
traditional to high technology activities. After 1980, a huge amount of FDI has been made 
to electronics as a sub-sector (See App. B, Tables 1-5). The government encouraged foreign 
investors to consider all possible projects either on their own or in joint ventures with the 
state electronics corporation, TESTAS.'^ Iron and steel, electrical and electronics products, 
basic metal industries, machinery and equipment, and chemicals were the most dynamic 
sectors of the last decade. The average rate of these sub-sectors was higher than that of the 
manufacturing sector as a whole, which reached an annual average growth rate of 7.4%
between 1980 and 1990. 16
The most important traditional sector, textiles, attracted new computer technologies 
in the industry. Between 1985 and 1990, hardware imports grew rapidly and stood over $ 1 
b i l l i on . The  other sectors using such technologies are durable goods producers, iron and 
steel, and automotive industry.
• Energy
There are 65 million tons of proven crude reserves of petroleum of Turkey. Law 
no. 2808, a petroleum operations law enacted in 1983, aims to exploit those reserves more 
efficiently. This law stimulated the incentives for foreign oil finns to invest in Turkey.'® 
From almost 50% of total primary energy consumption in 1978, petroleum by-products’ 
share decreased to nearly 40%, with hard coal, lignite, natural gas and hydraulic energy 
playing an increasingly important role.'’
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Since the early 1970s Turkey’s electricity consumption has been growing at an 
annual rate of 10%. Electricity production per year is estimated to increase from 52 billion 
kwh in 1989 to 200 billion kwh by the year 2000."° Electricity generation and production 
were under the monopoly of the Turkish Electricity Board (ТЕК) and two private 
monopolies till mid-1980s. Private sector investment is legal now.
The oil sector is another area becoming increasingly attractive to foreign investors. 
Petroleum Law was changed in the early 1980s to stimulate liberal activities. In the mid- 
1990s there were 25 companies in this sector. The deregulation of oil prices by the 
government in 1989 also eased the conditions under which private refiners can import crude 
oil and refined products.^'
4.5 Macroeconomic Developments
During the 1980s macroeconomic developments were generally positive, except the 
persistently high rate of inflation. The decade was characterized by high economic growth 
and a strong balance of payments. A relatively low average current account deficit—even 
account surplus in some years—was recorded, which was mainly due to growing 
merchandise exports, tourism revenues, and workers’ remittances. High capital inflows 
resulted in a steady increase in reserves. At the end of 1991, gross international reserves 
stood at almost $13 billion, which is equal to eight months’ imports, a comfortable level of 
liquidity by international standards.^^
During the second half of the decade, imbalances began to develop in the domestic 
budget even though a successful structural change was achieved in the external accounts.
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The public sector borrowing requirement rose to 12.6% of GNP in 1991 from 4.3% in 
1982. The inflation rate, as measured by the December to December increase in consumer 
prices, rose to 75% in 1988 from 35% in 1986. The volume of export increased in 1990s as 
compared to that of the 1980s.^  ^ Among the reasons of these positive developments were 
the increase in Turkey’s export to the ME countries, and the decrease in wages which are 
equivalent to low production costs, between 1980 and 1990.
The inability of the central government to control the growth of its expenditures 
and to repay its debts to the internal and external institutions, which have grown faster than 
revenues over most of the period, has been the main reason for the growing internal 
imbalance.
Table 4.2: Macroeconomic Developments of Turkey, 1980-1990
(Compound Annual Rates of Growth)
Real GNP 5.1%
Merchandise Exports 16.1%
Merchandise Imports 10.0%
Current Account Balance (average' $ (-)1.3 billion
Inflation Rate (Wholesale Prices) 54%
Source: YASED and Citibank. An Investment Guide to Tur cey, (Istanbul: YASED, 1
13.
4.6 FDI Inflows and Policies After 1980 in Turkey
After 1980, Turkey implemented the Japanese type development strategy, known as 
Soya Shasha, which emphasized industrial exports. This policy was also implemented by 
the newly industrializing countries such as South Korea, Brazil. '^  ^ The advantages of this 
system can be listed as follows:
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• The competition among the small export firms resulted in decrease in sale prices and 
profits in the external market. Therefore, large export firms should deal with exports.
• The risks in the external market was much more than internal market. So, large firms 
reduce the possibility of risks.
• The large firms could take credits much easier than small firms. They strengthened the 
position of the large firms at the external markets.
Therefore, Turkish government put some restrictions on export issues. For example, 
the authorized capital limit was $ 500 million in 1984, $ 2 billion in 1988, $ 5 billion in 
1989.^  ^ While on the one hand, Turkish economic policy tried to increase the volume of 
exports and liberalize its economy; on the other hand, small and middle firms were not 
allowed to deal with export affairs. This was one of the contradictions of Turkish economic 
policy after 1980. The Turkish economic policy resulted in monopolization in export affairs 
and the few large firms not only benefited from export subsidies from the state but also 
implemented an “Imaginary Export” (The Turkish phrase referring to the situation in which 
goods were not really exported but declared to the government as if they were exported to 
be able to benefit from government export promotions) in order to extract more resources 
from the state.
During 1980-1992, although Turkey had important economic and political ties with 
the EC and the USA, Turkey could not attract a large amount of EDI inflows as much as the 
governments of the period planned. Turkey applied to the EC for full membership in 1992, 
and Turkey signed a treaty for the custom union with the EC in 1996. These attempts can be 
interpreted as Turkey aimed to increase FDI inflows through EC.
Until 1980, the USA and EC were the major countries which brought FDI inflows 
into Turkey (See App. C, Tables 3,4,5). However, in 1980s, EC countries preferred to
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invest in the USA because of the USA’s high rate of growth. These conditions decreased 
FDI inflows in Turkey. Since the real wages in Turkey were too low until 1989, Turkey had 
a comparative advantage in labor intensive commodities. Unfortunately, the developed 
countries’ markets were closed to that type of trade. This condition also decreased Turkey’s 
chance for FDI inflows which was export-oriented. Rivalry among developing countries for 
FDI inflows, after 1980, resulted in world-wide liberalization of FDI policies. Therefore, 
Turkey did not have any comparative advantage in that period.
In the 1980s, production of technology and skill-intensive commodities and 
productive services were the major sectors which attracted FDI inflows. But, in that type of 
commodities, Turkey could not decrease the costs at a competitive level because of 
insufficient infrastructure, unskilled labor and lack of capital. Therefore, MNCs preferred to 
use Turkey as a large market rather than sending FDI inflows. Another reason for the low 
FDI inflows was the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Gulf Crisis, and The war in the 
eastern part of Turkey also affected FDI inflows in Turkey due to political instability in the 
region.
4.7 Sectoral Composition of FDI After 1980 in Turkey
When we look at the sectoral composition of FDI inflows in the 1980s, the share of 
the service sector was increasing while the share of the manufacturing sectors was 
decreasing in Turkey. In fact, the world-wide outflows on service sector increased in that 
period, also tourism, banking, trade as a sub-sector had the largest share in FDI inflows into 
Turkey. Foreign banks opened branches in Turkey in the early 1980s. This financial 
liberalization attracted FDI inflows, especially in the service sector in the 1983-1989 period 
(See App. B, Tables 1-5,7). The share of agriculture and mining remained low.
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Transportation vehicles, chemical, iron and steel, electrical machinery, textile had the 
largest share of FDI inflows on the manufacturing sector in Turkey (See App. B, Tables 1- 
4,7,). In the early 1980s, the share of manufacturing in total FDI decreased while the share 
of the service sector in total FDI increased in the period (See App. B, Tables 1,2 and App. 
A, Tables 1,2). Although the industrial sector absorbed the largest amount of FDI, this 
sector could not use the resources efficiently and could not export huge production amounts 
(See App. B, Tables 8 and 9). In other words, this sector could not reconvert the foreign 
resources into foreign exchange due to the dependency on FDI, inefficient production and 
managerial structures during the 1980s.^ ®
The sectoral distribution between 1980-1983 was not different than the previous 
period. Manufacturing sector had the largest share at the level of 74% in total FDI inflows. 
Electrical machinery, transportation vehicles, textile and food sectors were the leading sub­
sectors. The share of the service sector in total FDI reached the level of 25% (See App. B, 
Tables 1,2). Thus the FDI inflows to the services sector has started to increase in Turkey in 
parallel to the increase in the world after 1980.
Between 1984 and 1986, the share of the manufacturing sector in total FDI inflows 
decreased at the level of 60%. Aeroplane, iron and steel, and electronics were the leading 
sub-sectors. The share of the service sector in total FDI increased to 36%. Banking was the 
leading sub-sector (See App. B, Tables 1,3). In this period, FDI inflows to the services 
sector has continued to increase since some Middle East countries channelled their capital 
to Turkey by way of the banks they established in Turkey.
Between 1987 and 1989, the share of the manufacturing sector in total FDI inflows 
decreased to 55%. Chemicals, food, transportation vehicles and iron and steel were the 
leading sub-sectors. The share of the service sector in total FDI increased to 39%. Tourism
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was the leading sub-sector (See App. B, Tables 1,4). The data shows that, in this period, 
FDI inflows to the manufacturing sector has reached the lowest level whereas FDI inflows 
to the services sector has reached the highest level of the 1980s. The sudden rise in the FDI 
inflows to the tourism sub-sector was the reason of the increase in services sector in 
addition to the reasons explained above. On the other hand, the decrease of the FDI inflows 
to the leading sub-sectors of the manufacturing sector was the cause of the above 
mentioned decrease.
Between 1990 and 1992, the manufacturing sector shares in total FDI inflows 
increased to 63.48%. Food, chemicals, transportation vehicles were the leading sub-sectors. 
The share of the service sector in total FDI inflows decreased to 32%. Tourism was the 
leading sub-sector (See App. B, Tables 5,11). A decrease in the FDI inflows to the services 
sector and a small increase in the manufacturing sector were observed when compared with 
the previous period.
Between 1993-1995, the manufacturing sector shares in total FDI inflows increased 
to 71%. The reason of the increase was the huge FDI absorption of the transportation 
vehicles sub-sector. The share of the service sector in total FDI inflows continued to 
decrease to 26.9%, due to the decrease in the FDI inflows to the banking sub-sector. 
Tourism was the leading sub-sector (See App. B, Tables 5,12).
During 1980-1989, the share of the manufacturing in total FDI decreased gradually 
while the service increased to 40% of total FDI inflows. The share of tourism as a sub­
sector of service increased. The share of the cement and soil sub-sector in total FDI 
increased after 1987 because of selling many cement factories to foreign investors (See 
App. B, Tables 1-5,7). During 1980-1989, the sectoral distribution of FDI decreased in
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manufacturing whereas it increased in service. Tourism emerged as the leading sub-sector 
(See App. B, Tables 1-5).
During 1990-1995, the share of the manufacturing increased because of foreign 
investment in transportation vehicles and cement productions (See App. B, Tables 
1,5,11,12). There was a decline in service because of unsuccessful attempts in the tourism 
sub-sector during the Gulf War.
4.8 The Ratios of Total FDI Inflow in Sectors to GNP
Between 1980 and 1995, there was an expectation for the increase in the ratio of 
total FDI to GNP due to enactment of new laws for FDI inflows, and the willingness of 
official economic policy to attract FDI into Turkey. But, although there was an increase in 
the ratio, the expectations were not satisfied. The ratio of FDI to GNP was too small in 
1980. But there was an increase in 1981. Until 1986, the gradual increase continued and in 
1989, the ratio reached the level of 1.1%. After 1989, except 1994, the ratio fluctuated 
around 1.1%. In 1990, the ratio decreased in spite of reaching the 1% as a ratio. During the 
1990s, the FDI to GNP ratios were around 1% (See App. B, Table 10). The higher the FDI 
to GNP ratio, the more FDI attracted into a country. Therefore, we can conclude that 
Turkey has attracted more FDI in 1990s when compared to the previous decade.
On the other hand, after 1980, the ratios of the agriculture, industry and service 
sectors to GNP reflected interesting results. The service sector’s share in GNP was the 
largest share after 1980. In other words, the service sector increased its share in GNP."’ 
The FDI inflows, after 1980, to the service sector increased during the 1980s. It can be 
concluded that the FDI inflows increased “the productions” of the service sectors after
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1980. Especially, the FDI inflows to the service sector reached the highest level in 1989, 
and the share of the service sector on GNP increased after that year. The parallel 
developments among FDI inflows to the service sector and the service sector share on GNP 
may give us some clues about the depended economic developments to foreign resources 
(See App. B, Tables 1-5, 10-12).
Although the manufacturing sector had the largest share in FDI inflows, the share of 
the manufacturing sector in GNP fluctuated around 25% after 1980.^* It can be concluded 
that FDI inflows on this sector could not increase the share of the sector on GNP. The 
reasons could be lack of high-technology in this sector, lack of trained labor and managers, 
insufficient productivity. In other words, there were structural problems in the 
manufacturing sector which resulted in a constant production level although the sector 
attracted high amounts of FDI compared to other sectors (See App. B, Tables 1-5, 10-12).
Although the agriculture sector did not attract high amounts of FDI inflows, the 
sectoral share on GNP was around 15%.^  ^ This can be concluded that this sector needed to 
be channeled new resources and have not depended on foreign resources, yet (See App. B, 
Table 10).
4.9 Country Shares of FDI in Turkey After 1980
During 1980-1995, there was a fluctuating trend in the distribution of FDI in the 
context of source country. Many European countries and the USA were the leading 
countries. During 1980-1983, Switzerland had the largest share in total FDI, followed by 
Germany, the USA, France. During 1984-1986, the USA became the largest investor 
followed by Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Germany. In fact, the banking sector had the largest
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share in service especially from Saudi Arabia in that period. During 1987-1989, the share of 
the UK increased, followed by Switzerland, France, the USA. The tourism sector increased 
its share in service, especially from EC. During 1990-92, France had the largest share in 
total FDI followed by the USA, the Netherlands, Germany. Between 1993-1995, the 
Netherlands, France, the USA and Germany were the leading countries, respectively (See 
App. B, Table 6). The selling of public sector attracted foreign capital into Turkey, 
especially from EC’s MNCs. In the 1980s, the USA share in the total FDI inflows to 
Turkey decreased as a result of the economic crises in the USA. The reason of the increase 
in FDI share of the European countries in the same period was Turkey’s attempts to 
integrate with the EC. Coming to the 1990s, although there occurred an increase in the 
share of the USA it was not at the level of the increase in the share of the EC, thus the 
ranking did not change.
Turkey’s aim in the 1980s was to increase the amount of export of manufactured 
goods. Therefore, Turkey tried to channel FDI on manufacturing sectors in order to create 
new investments, employment and new technology inflows. But the expectations of Turkey 
were not realistic, because FDI firms never preferred international export markets and 
foreign capital, rather they preferred to exploit internal markets and domestic capital. The 
FDI firms established sub-sectors and sale offices rather than factories or industry. 
Therefore, Turkish human resources could not benefit from new technology, new 
managerial and marketing skills. In fact, although there was an increase in manufacture 
exports from developing countries to developed countries, even in the 1960s and early 
1970s, only certain countries such as South Korea, Hong Kong, and Brazil benefited from 
this export increase.
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4.10 FDI Firms in Turkey
Since December 1983, all commercial and service sectors have opened to FDI, 
foreign portfolio equity investment in Turkish firms has been made easier, the employment 
of foreign personnel for FDI firms has been put under fewer restrictions. Turkey has 
established free-trade zones that offered foreign firms tax exemptions and more liberal 
currency regulations. They were approved in 1982 in order to strengthen Turkey’s role as 
the commercial links between West and Middle East especially through export oriented
FDI.30
FDI firms who are owned by the foreigners contributed a small amount to Turkish 
exports. Until 1985, the share of FDI exports in total manufactured exports was too small. 
After 1988, the share showed an increasing trend. In 1992, the share reached its top level. 
The largest FDI exports were transportation vehicles, cement and soil products, textile and 
clothing. The largest FDI firms ranking in the 500 largest industrial firms of Turkey 
increased their shares in total exports after 1988. Flowever, in 1992 the share declined (See 
App. B, Tables 8 and 9).
The FDI firms’ share in total exports increased gradually between 1984 and 1991. 
There was a sudden increase in 1988. This may be the result of privatization of some public 
institutions which was sold to foreign investors. FDI shares in total sales fluctuated between 
1981 and 1991. But there was a sudden increase in 1991. The FDI share increased in total 
sales because the Turkish industrial, agricultural, service sectors decreased their total 
production level. (See App. B, Tables 8 and 9) Neither the public nor the private sector 
could produce and sell goods as compared to the previous period.
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The amount of foreign capital permits reached a maximum amount of $2,938 
million in 1995, as Table 4.3 demonstrates. When compared with the cumulative total of 
foreign capital permits since 1959 which has been $16,758 million, the 1995 amount 
accounted for almost 18% share of this total figure (See App. B, Table 7). 35.2% of these 
permits were directed towards new investments, 19.5% to participations in companies, and 
18% to capital increases in companies. When the levels were compared with those attained 
in 1994, it becomes clear that there was an increase in the contribution of foreign capital to 
production and employment levels. The actual foreign capital inflow into the country has 
been higher than previous years, with the temporary figure adding up to $ 1.250 million. In 
1995 the total “Permit and Incentive Certificates” prepared for foreign capital companies 
reached TL 328.5 trillion, nine times higher in comparison to 1994.^*
4.11 Foreign Capital in Turkey in 1995
Table 4.3: Distribution Of Foreign Capital Permits in Turkey(1995)
Sector Number 
of Permits
Portfolio
Foreign Capital 
$ Million
Type of 
New
Investment
Extension Cap. Increase
Agriculture 33 31.74 19.09 1.51 5.54 5.6
Mining 17 60.62 17.16 0 10.03 33.43
Manufacturing 411 1996.48 610.36 472.33 411.93 501.87
Services 764 849.48 388.85 34.21 394.22 32.2
Total 1225 2938.32 1035.46 508.05 821.72 573.1
Source: Türk Ekonomi Bank, The New Investment Environment in Turkey. (Istanbul: 
Intermedia 1996), 46.
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4.12 Sectoral Distribution of Permits Issued in 1995
The foreign capital reached $577.1 million as a consequence of 28 permits issued in 
the automotive industry, with 47.3% of permits in this sector directed towards improvemert 
of existing establishments, 28.4 to new investments, and 23.1% to portfolio investments. 
The automotive support industry received capital permits valued at $118.9 million, with
43% share in both new and for the improvement of existing investments.32
With 47 permits issued, foreign investment valued at $364.2 million was for the 
chemical industry, 75.5% of which was for new and 19% for the improvement of existing 
investments.. 28.9% of the total capital share of the permits went to the services sector. 
Other community services received 37.3% of the total share, while hotels participated 
19.99% and general trade 13.4%. The share of the new and the existing investments was 
49.8%, while 46.4% was directed to capital increases of existing companies. The portfolio 
investments in the cement industry accounted for 96.8% of permits in 1995. Foreign 
capital permits in the food industry in 1995 was $171 million.
On the other hand, portfolio investments increased 12 times in the electrical 
machinery industry, and three and two times, for improvement and for new investments, 
respectively. The amount of foreign capital permits in the sector was $191.8 million (See 
App. A ,Table 2).^“
4.13 Distribution of Permits Issued in 1995 According to the Countries
In the year before the signing of the Customs Union Treaty, foreign capital arriviig 
from the European Union Countries amounted to $1,873 billion, shares divided among the
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Netherlands, French and German companies as 30.5%, 25.4% and 21%, respectively. The 
share of European Union countries (EU) within the total was 63.9%. The amount of 
European capital coming to Turkey increased by 93%, compared to 1994. Just like the 
OECD countries, the amount of foreign capital investments increased by 101% in 
comparison to 1994, reaching $2,758 billion. Sweden, Austria, and the USA are 
shareholders at $327, $283 and $231 million respectively (See App. A, Table 3). The 
reasons of distributing these permits were Turkey’s opening its borders to the EU 
countries, accelerating the privatization program, and attempting to attract more EDI 
inflows.
4.14 Total Actual Entries
The interim amount for real inflow by the end of 1995 remained at $1250 million 
when contrasted to the amount of $830 million. The effects of the economic development 
and recovery in 1995 manifested themselves in foreign capital permits. Whereas the foreign 
capital permits added up to $1484,66 million by the end of 1994, the figure for the same 
period reached $ 2938,32 million for 1995 (See App. A, Tables 1,2.).
When a country based analysis of the 1995 foreign investment figures is made, it is 
understood that $1873,37 million worth of permits went to OECD countries, $70,29 million 
to Islamic countries, $19.82 million to eastern European countries and $82,49 million to the 
remaining others (See App. A, Table 3).^ ^
The Netherlands goes ahead in the amount of foreign capital permits with $559,2 
million, followed by France with $476,05 million, Germany with $392,13 million, 
Switzerland with $327,75 million, and Japan with $283,84 million. The total number of
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companies with foreign capital reached 3,161 and the amount of total capital 113 trillion 
TL at the end of 1995 (See App. A, Table 3).
4.15 General Outlook of Foreign Capital in 1990s
The number of foreign capital companies functioning in Turkey reached 3,161 and 
the amount of foreign capital investments to $16,758,15 million, as of the end of December 
1995. 2,214 of these companies operated in the services, 818 in the manufacturing, 79 in 
the agricultural and 44 in the mining sectors (See App. A, Table 1).
The permits distributed in 1995 ($2938,32 million) increased by 38.25% and 
97.84% as compared to the same period in 1993 ($2125 million) and 1994 ($1484,66 
million), respectively (See App. A, Table 2). The inflow between 1990-1995 reveals an 
annual mean of $1.88 billion of foreign capital permits. Total amount of foreign capital 
since 1990 has been as follows: $1,861 million; $1,967 million; $1,820 million; $2,125 
million; $1,485 million $2,938 million, respectively (See App. A, Tables 1,2.).
As shown in the previous sections, although permits were issued to be high, their 
realization could not be that high. That is because foreign investors-either countries or 
firms—did not find Turkey to be a reliable country as a result of Turkey’s political, 
economic, and social instabilities.
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CHAPTER V
TURKISH FDI POLICIES AFTER 1980
In this chapter we will examine Turkey’s FDI policies after 1980 from a different 
point of view. This part of the thesis, essentially, deals with the policy changes in 
legislations, decrees, and incentives after 1980. We will therefore present all incentives 
enacted in accordance with these policy changes. Section 5.1 presents a general outlook to 
the Turkey’s FDI situation. Section 5.2 discusses the background of FDI policies with its 
laws, incentives and programs. Section 5.3 examines FDI incentive legislations in Turkey. 
Section 5.4 shows some foreign investment framework decrees.
5.1 Outlook for the FDI in Turkey
Different from most of the other developing countries, Turkey has natural resources, 
labor and an expanding market. This function of Turkey has provided the Turkish 
businessmen the opportunity to play an active role in the neighborhood markets within a 
very short duration. Turkish enterprises then looked for partners who can bring technology, 
management and some capital to convert the country to an economic bridge between the 
West and the East.
Foreigners make investments in Turkey due to the following reasons:
• Turkey offers a ready-to-purchase growing domestic sector because of its young 
population over 69 million.
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• Turkey has a relatively inexpensive labor force.
• Turkey also has a reasonable network of communications and transportation facilities 
coupled with organized industrial units.
• There are operational free zones in Turkey.
Today, more than 3161 companies are performing various activities such as storing 
exhibition, packing, trading, banking, insurance, assembling, and disassembling in the zones 
provided that they are pollution free (See App. A, Table 2). Turkish free zones are 
completely tax free. The trade between free zones and home country is treated as foreign 
trade. The merchandise brought into the free zones can be sent abroad with or without 
being processing. The following privileges are offered in the zones:'
• Reduced bureaucracy
• No customs formalities or charges on imports and exports of all investment materials
• No corporation tax on any income generated, even if that income is transferred to sister 
companies in Turkey.
• Exemption from export procedures on exports from Turkey higher than $500 value.
• No income taxes.
• No obligation to account in Turkish Lira.
5.2 Background of FDI Policies in Turkey
Because of its need for foreign exchange resources, Turkey put into effect in 1954 
law no: 6224 concerning the encouragement of foreign capital.^ The law in question was 
considered as only a framework text and this resulted in the practical enhancement of the 
weight of the policies implemented. Until 1980, international capital movements did not
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affect Turkey very much due to the conservative attitude of the governments towards 
foreign currency.
Foreign investors--except several foreign banks from the USA and Middle East 
Countries—adopted a wait-and-see attitude till 1980s when new laws were enacted. 
Foreign investors were especially interested in the agro-industry and tourism sectors 
however they hesitated to make capital and technology investment in Turkey due to political 
uncertainty, together with some other legal and administrative obstacles.^
Some of the important economic policy changes which occurred during the 1980s 
were the deregulation of interest rates, reforms in the banking sector, liberalization of the 
capital movements, establishment of organized markets for foreign exchange, stocks and 
securities. After these changes, a comprehensive economic stabilization and liberalization 
program was put into application instead of previous protectionist economic policies. The 
aims of this new program were:'*
• Minimizing state intervention
• Establishment of free market economy
• Integration of Turkish economy with the world economic system
Together with the resolutions enacted on January 24, 1980 some developments 
about foreign capital applications took place, such as the establishment of the department of 
foreign investment. This department arranged all the transactions regarding foreign capital 
to be performed at the level of single authority, further facilitated the formalities and 
provided the opportunity to invest in Turkey to companies active in any field not only in the 
manufacturing sector.^ More liberal and flexible provisions on the transactions of the 
foreign capital were introduced with the enactment of decree no: 32.®
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Consequently, the Turkish Lira became fully convertible : transfer of profits, fees, 
royalties and capital--in case of liquidation--was let free by law no: 6224. Foreign 
investment was further promoted by being a party to several bilateral and multilateral 
agreements and organizations. Council of Europe, The World Bank, IMF, OECD, Asian 
Development Bank, GATT, NATO and UN.’
Foreign capital inflow to Turkey had increased at a high rate following the new 
arrangements affected in law no: 6224, from an amount of $ 280 million foreign capital 
investment between 1980 and the year law no: 6224 was enacted to an amount of $1250 
million FDI inflow in 1995 (See App. C, Table 1; App. A, Tables 1,2). During the 1980-July 
1995 period, a total of $ 16.8 billion value of foreign direct investment has been approved 
and inflows reached to $ 8.8 billion (See App A, Tables 1,2 and 3). Between 1980 and 
1995, most of the foreign capital were in the services sector and manufacturing sector (See 
App. A, Table 1).
5.3 New Incentive Legislation
Export and FDI incentive systems are being arranged so that they are in line with 
Turkey’s commitment under EU, Custom Union and the GATT. The new incentive system 
has some differences. First of all, the preferred incentives to be given are investment 
allowances; value added tax (VAT) deferrals; tax, duty, and charges exemption; and 
financing fund by which all kind of tax reduction and/or exemption can be rendered during 
the investment phase. The region of investment is the main criterion for granting the 
incentives. The incentive regime in 1995 brought about the “industrial belts” concept in 
addition to the established priority areas. 20 organized industrial zones and 18 provinces 
have been placed under this concept and compromised sectors with special importance.*
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Investments made on these areas are granted with higher incentives. The “industrial belts” 
are generally defined as provinces suitable in terms of infrastructure potentials for 
industrialization. The objective of the regional based incentives are to encourage 
investments and to direct them to the less developed regions of the country. Some of the 
major changes coming into force with the new legislation are:^
• The minimum required total fixed investment amount to enjoy an incentive certificate is 
6 billion TL for investments to be realized in priority development regions and 10 billion 
TL for all other investments.
• The amount to be deposited in the incentive fund at The Central Bank at the time of 
application for an incentive certificate is 20 billion TL for investments in priority 
development regions and in industrial belts and, 50 million TL for investments other 
regions.
• Capital/credit ratio should be 40% for investments in priority development regions, 50% 
for normal regions and 60% for developed regions. If there is foreign or foreign exchange 
credit, the capital/credit ratio can be decreased to 15%.
Turkey offers some advantages and incentives to potential investors. According to 
the foreign investment act, equal treatment is the basis for all investors. As a result, foreign 
investors have the same rights and responsibilities as local investors. When investing in 
Turkey, foreign investors are required to make a minimum investment of $ 50.000 and are 
treated equally with Turkish investors.
5.3.1 Investment Incentives
As mentioned above investment incentives are granted depending on which part of 
the country the investment goes to. Some of the investment incentives are as follows:
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• Customs, Duties and Fund Exemption
Most--if not all-machinery and equipment imported for the investment are subject to 
exemption. A fund payment of 5-20 percent must be made, however, for some of them. 
According to the relevant legislation, the investments to be made in “industrial belts” and 
priority development zones are exempt from the 5 percent fund payment.
• Investment Allowance
This allowance results in the corporate tax exemption for the investments. Depending on 
the location of the investment the rates of investment allowance changes between 39 percent 
and 100 percent of total fixed investment.
• Subsidized Credit Facility
It is available for Research and Development (R&D) projects and environment investments. 
For the year 1995, this facility was available for investments to be realized in priority 
development regions and industrial belts up 15% to 25% of the total fixed amount.
• Soft Loans
It is granted to R&D investments, environmental investments, small and medium size 
enterprises and special credits. Investors can also benefit from additional tax deferrals.
• Research and Development (R&D)
The corporations can defer up to 20% of their annual corporate tax amounts for a duration 
of three years provided that this sum would not exceed R&D expenditures of the 
corporation during that year.
• Financial Fund
Corporations that have started activity and that are continuing their ongoing investments can 
defer their corporate tax obligations up to 25% of the corporate tax accrued, provided that 
they deposit its amount in a fund at The Central Bank.
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5.3.2 Export Incentives
Several exports incentives are available for investors in Turkey. These are 
exemption from various taxes, fees and duties; exemption from customs duty on raw 
materials and semi-product imports; and export credits through Eximbank. Most of the 
incentives are related with manufacturing and mining sectors.
5.4 Foreign Investment Framework Decree
Collective bargaining, strikes and lock-outs were put in a strict, disciplinary 
framework after 1980. This strong government control on relations with labor assured 
foreign investors for a stable working environment.” With the 1980 Framework Decree on 
Foreign Investment extraordinary advantages were provided to investments in some sectors 
such as tourism'^ (See App. B, Table 1). To exemplify, the share of the foreign ownership 
can be as high as 100 percent without any negotiations with the Turkish government.'^ In 
1982, Law no: 2634 for the Encouragement of Tourism Investments was enacted with which 
land and credit allocations to tourism ventures have been liberalized.
The new foreign investment framework decree enacted on June 7, 1995 brought 
Turkey’s foreign investment regime to a much more liberal point at which the formalities
15were reduced:
1. The same rights and obligations for foreign investors and local ones.
2. No limitation in equity participation ratios.
3. No limitation in entering sectors.
4. The free transfers of profits, fees, royalties and the repatriation of capital.
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5. All foreign investments applications without taking into consideration the amount of 
capital are evaluated by General Directorate of Foreign Investment.
6. The approval requirement for license, know-how, technical assistance and management 
agreements is lifted in the new decree.
In short, this new decree has the aim of reducing the bureaucratic formalities for the 
foreign investments to be made in Turkey.
5.4.1 Privatization Program
The privatization program, set up with act no: 4046 as an autonomous government 
agency, aimed to implement an immense privatization program. Within this program, 
government shares in textile, iron, steel, petrochemicals, oil, telecommunications, and air
transport sectors are aimed to be sold to foreign investors as blocks. 16
5.4.2 The Build-Operate-Transfer Model
Build-Operate-Transfer (ВОТ) model offers foreign investors the opportunity to 
participate in the large infrastructure projects as investors. Furthermore, the government 
guarantees buying the^iroducts or service output of the investments at a certain price over a 
certain period. A special law was enacted for the adoption of this model. The related 
ministry or a state economic enterprise may enter into an agreement with the investors 
which qualify for the initiation and operation of the investment. Through the ВОТ model, 
projects such as the following have been opened to the private sector: Natural gas power 
plant, lignite power plant, hydroelectric power plant, establishment and operation of free
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zones, bridges and tunnels, highways and railways, seaports and airports, 
telecommunication projects.'^
5.5 Conclusion
The main determinant of the FDI practice of Turkey is the interaction of its given 
external factors and internal conditions. The external factors can be listed as the state of the 
world economy, economic environment of source countries, tactics of MNCs, and finally, 
the relative position of competing countries.
Although foreign investment inflows are considered as a mechanism to help fix 
Turkey’s balance of payments difficulties, this is not of chief significance. These inflows 
have a short-lived restorative effect and can be hardly turned into outflows. Their main 
importance for Turkey is through the advanced technology, know-how and skills the foreign 
investor brings with him. Between 1950 and 1960, Turkish industry was not very well- 
developed when compared with its foreign contemporaries. Plants were frequently second­
hand and this was enough for those days since there was a great void in the market. 1980s 
and 1990s, however, witnessed an increased demand for quality and new products. New 
entrepreneurs entered the market and these pressures forced the manufacturers to search 
other markets. This resulted in a need to have world standard goods produced in higher 
volumes and with less cost. This was provided by foreign investors who brought not only 
their money but also their licenses, patents, know-how and names.
To illustrate, the food industry in Turkey is rich in kind. However, it was a problem 
to transport those foods to the European consumer. Foreign technology helped Turkey to 
produce ready made soups, shock-frozen fruits and nuts without afrotoxin or to convert its
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livestock into vacuum packed sausages, salami and steaks ready to be consumed. Hence, 
not only has Turkey found new markets for its products but also a higher portion of value 
added has stayed in Turkey. Therefore, the new technology and increased capacity has 
helped Turkey to create value added, revenues, salaries, tax and export incomes.
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CHAPTER VI
EDI EXPERIENCES OF LATIN AMERICAN REGION:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The two regions, Turkey and Latin America, had similar economic, political, and 
social structures in the pre-1980 period. In the post-1980 period, although both regions 
opened their economies to FDI inflows, they experienced different developments. The 
reasons of this diversification would provide a deeper insight for understanding the Turkish 
FDI experience and serve as a basis for future FDI plans of Turkey. This is why we analyze 
the FDI experience of the Latin American countries in comparison to that of Turkey.
In this chapter, we will examine the FDI experiences of Latin American countries 
during the 1980-1995 period. We will emphasize the economic structures and policy 
changes of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico together with the rest of the countries in the 
continent. Both of these topics have been examined since 1980 by UNCTAD Reports. 
Section 1 presents the FDI experiences, some economic indicators and the accepted theory 
by many academicians and policymakers in the continent during 1900-1980. Section 2 
discusses the economic and political policy shift and its effects on FDI. Section 3 presents 
the results of the policy changes and the situation of FDI from 1990 to 1996.
6.1 FDI Experiences Between 1960 and 1980
6.1.1 Some Economic Indicators During 1900-1980
In Latin America, between 1900 and 1980, the average annual growth rate of per 
capita Gross Domestic Production (GDP) followed a positive trend. The average rate for
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the countries increased from 1.29 percent in the 1900-1960 period to 2.37 percent in the 
1960-1980 period. In the rate of overall GDP growth before 1980, Brazil, Chile and Mexico 
presented unstable increases, while Argentina and Colombia were relatively stable (See 
App. D, Table 8). One of the reasons of the stability was that expansionary periods lasted 
much longer than contractionary periods.'
Table 6.1: Average Annual Growth Rate of GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1900-80
COUNTRIES
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
GDP(Growth Rate %)
1900-40 1940-80
3.8 3.2
3.5 6.2
2.5 4.0
4.5 4.6
2.0 6.5
PER CAPITA GDP(Growth Rate
%)
1900-40 1940-80
0.8 1.2
1.2 3.2
1.2 1.6
2.4 2.4
1.4 3.4
Source: Victor J. Elias, Sources of Growth: A study of Seven Latin American Economies. 
(San Francisco: ICS Press., 1992), p. 14.
The growth dynamics of the Latin American countries after 1945 were highly 
dependent on the acceleration and slowdown synchronization with those of the developed 
countries, the quality and productivity of labor, and the rate of technological changes. In 
addition to those, policy variables, such as government expenditures, the size of the fiscal 
deficits and foreign trade, were the other elements for explaining the diverse rates of 
growth.^ Even though they had different growth rates they can still be treated within a 
single category since they have similar economic, political and social structures, especially 
similar amount and source of FDI inflows.
6.1.2 FDI Experiences and Dependencia Approach
In Latin America, in the period 1945-60, FDI was perceived as the primary engine 
for development. By the early 1970s, constraints on the autonomy of FDI through MNCs
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were implemented in order to mitigate the socio-economic costs. The “Dependencia” 
approach whose scholars were “analyzing the conditions of development and 
underdevelopment, together with FDI and technology as paramount dependence issues”  ^
and which began to gain popularity among social scientists and policy makers in Latin 
America in the late 1960s claims that foreign firms drain capital from host countries by 
exporting more funds than are brought in, in addition to this, they accused foreign investors 
generating distorted consumption patterns, displacing established local firms, intervening in 
local politics, altering income distribution and eroding the living conditions of the ordinary 
people.'*
After the mid-1960s, most, if not all, Latin American governments, more or less, 
applied the arguments of the Dependencia approach to politics and economics. The new 
politics toward FDI was soon reflected in public policy across the continent. For instance, 
Argentina enacted a set of legal guidelines regulating FDI in 1971; Bolivia, Colombia, Peru 
and Chile formed the Andean Pact which established a common restrictive policy toward 
FDI in 1971; Mexico and Brazil introduced similar restriction in the mid-1970s. However, 
the experience and implementation in Latin America concerning the regulation of FDI 
varied according to the political and economic conditions of the countries in the continent. 
Furthermore, the practical experience of several Latin American countries showed that a 
restrictive regulatory system toward FDI was not a strong barrier to new FDI. On the other 
hand, a liberal regulation together with incentives was not a significant way for diffusing 
FDI.^
During the 1970s, in the context of FDI experiences, the similarity between Latin 
America and Turkey is striking. Just as in Latin America, Turkish state intervened 
financial, social and political crises of 1970s and implemented ISI strategy for growth. 
Another resemblance is the condensation of FDI inflows in machinery and electrical
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machinery, transportation equipment, rubber products, tobacco, and chemicals 
manufactured sub-sectors. The only exception to this similarity is the pharmaceuticals sub­
sector. Foreign capital dominancy in some sectors of Turkey also parallels to the USA 
capital dominancy in Latin America (See App. C, Tables 3,4,5 and Tables 6.2, 6.3). The 
difference is that, perhaps as a result of geographical proximity, European capital is the 
second, after the USA, the most dominant foreign capital in Turkey’s FDI inflow (See App. 
C, Tables 3,4,5). However, the lack of the corresponding consensus between the local and 
foreign capital prevented Turkey from experiencing similar economic and political 
developments like Latin America. This is one of the reasons of Turkey’s losing its semi­
periphery property and remaining as a periphery country. As Çağlar Keyder clearly states, 
the main contradiction between the local capital and foreign capital is not structural but 
conjectural.® One of the reasons of this contradiction is the fear of the local capital 
dominated in agro-industry from losing its shares from the exploitation and losing its power 
to the foreign capital, dominated in manufactured sectors, in the context of both economic 
and ideological spheres. Since 1970, both groups have been struggling to exploit the 
surplus value and integrate with the world economy through their own products. Therefore, 
they accepted to integrate with the world economy provided that their self interests are 
protected.
6.2 Economic Policy Changes and its Effects on FDI
For most Latin American countries, there was low economic growth and instability 
in the economies. These countries not only suffered the worldwide instability that began 
after 1974, but also had negative growth until the mid-1980s. Although many factors were 
responsible for the unstable economic performances, the large amount of foreign debt
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borrowed by Latin American countries was one of the main reasons.^ Towards the end of 
the 1980s, only a few Latin American countries could achieve to reach recovery period.
6.2.1 The Turbulent Period
After the “Import Substituting” period of the 1970s, foreign firms’ labor 
productivity levels and growth rates were much higher than those of similar sized domestic 
firms.* Although many Latin American countries implemented open-door policies after 
1980, low FDI continued to be a serious problem. Especially, in Chile and Colombia, 
capital inflows played a smaller role to achieve growth and s tab i l i tyFDI was mostly less 
important than other long-term capital inflows in the 1980s for the Latin American countries 
since the debt crises necessitated urgent liquid short-term money.’® The economies with 
widespread macroeconomic imbalances such as large budget deficits and hyperinflation 
were in serious crisis. In addition to that, private investments and exports did not seem to 
be the driving forces of growth and recovery (See App. D, Table 1). Thus, except 
Chile(because of strong state intervention and external political support), most of the 
countries in the region could not achieve to complete their own structural adjustments and 
attract new FDI inflows (See App. D, Table 5)."
During the turbulent years, selected countries, except Brazil, shown in the Table 6.2 
attracted foreign capital into their secondary product sectors. This means that the countries 
belonged to the “semi-periphery”’^  category, an integral part of which is the international 
capital. In other words, as industrial production moved from the center to the periphery, the 
relations of production of the previous period were extended, instead of being transformed. 
The periphery became part of an integrated system of industrial production whose control 
continued to remain in the center. This is the industrialization inserted by foreign-owned
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firms on the periphery. Namely, the previous periphery countries experienced “the 
internalization of international capital”'^ In that context, Brazil experienced and adapted 
itself to the semi-periphery system much faster than the other Latin American countries 
during the 1970 and 1980s. Especially, “the consensus between local and foreign capital 
around the issue of accumulation of industrial capital, more complex internal division of 
labor and increased productivity, and the direct intervention to the crisis of the Brazilian 
state”'“* played important roles in attracting new FDI. The result was the huge foreign 
stocks in the Brazilian secondary and tertiary product sectors. In this period., in six 
Brazilian industries(machinery and electrical machinery, transportation equipment, rubber 
products, tobacco, chemicals and pharmaceuticals) foreign, especially USA, capital was 
dominant.'^ In the other industries such as leather products, footwear and paper products, 
local capital held the predominant position. A similar foreign capital superiority on the 
same industries also existed in other Latin American countries.
Just as in many Latin American countries, low FDI inflows and economic crises 
continued to be serious problems in Turkey during the 1980s. As we have stated 
previously for the 1970s, during the 1980s, unlike the Latin American countries whose main 
source of FDI inflows was the USA, European countries had the largest share of FDI 
inflows to Turkey.
Between 1980 and 1989, Turkey’s growth rate was very high. The main reasons 
behind this achievement were the high volume of exports to the Middle East (ME) 
countries, low wages, weak domestic demands and high external credits in the country. 
Another reason was the enactment of many laws after 1980, the aims of which were to open 
all commercial and service sectors to the capitalist economy, to increase portfolio 
investment, to purchase foreign technology, and to employ fo rei^  personnel for FDI firms. 
By this way, foreign investors could easily find favorable conditions to exploit the resources
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and the domestic market in Turkey rather than exporting what they have produced in the 
country. However, in Latin America, the similar laws and regulations concerning both FDI 
and trade liberalization were enacted after the mid-1980s. In our opinion, the reason of 
Latin America’s being late in enacting the regulations and laws was the authoritarian 
regimes of the region who did not feel the necessity to enact them but did rather behave 
arbitrarily. The emergence of the notion of democratization, during the late 1980s, forced 
those governments to make regulations and mles.
Table 6.2: Industrial Distribution of Foreign Direct Capital Stock of Selected Latin 
American Countries in Selected Years (US $ million)
1977-83 1977-82 1977-83 1981 1981-83 1975-1981
Sectors/Countries Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Primary Product 793 758 824 N.A. 522 3194
Secondary Product 1399 16007 502 868.6 14814 726
Tertiary Product 754 22154 667 N.A. 3355 430
Total 2854 21831 1993 N.A. 18691 4350
SourceJohn Dunning and John Cantwell, IRM Directory of Statistics of International 
Investment and Production. (London: Macmillian Press, 1987), pp. 643, 663, 674, 685, 723, 
749.
Table 6.3: Leading Home Country and Sectors Attracting FDI in the Selected Latin 
American Countries in Selected Years
1977-83 1977-82 1977-83 1981 1981-83 1975-1981
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Leading Home 
Country
USA USA USA USA USA USA
Leading Sectors Petroleum 
and Motor 
Vehicles
Motor
Vehicles
Machinery Chemicals Chemicals Machinery
Rubberand Oil
Petroleum
Source: Source:John Dunning and John Cantwell, IRM Directory of Statistics of 
International Investment and Production. (London: Macmillian Press, 1987), pp. 649-50, 
668-69,679,727,753, 775.
6.2.2 The Recovery Period
In the late 1980s, economic and political adjustments were being completed in the 
continent. In this period, macroeconomic stability was slow in Brazil and Venezuela, and
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was still perceived as fragile in Argentina and Peru. In addition, the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, together with widespread trade liberalization and weak domestic demand, 
was discouraging trade.'^ Although efforts to strengthen domestic firms and their 
technological capacities continued, the role of FDI in the export-investment within the 
region played an important role in the catching-up process.
6.2.2.1 Trade and FDI
Trade among the countries of the region grew rapidly because of both unilateral 
trade liberalization and the strengthening of trade groups such as Mercosur, The Andean 
Group and The Latin American Integration Association. The intra-regional exports and 
imports of the secondary and tertiary products grew rapidly during the period (See App. D, 
Table 6).”  Regional firms accompanied with MNCs were the chief actors for the increased 
volume of trades within the region. However, the existing structure of most of the 
economies in the region was still relying on raw materials and primary products for their 
export earnings.'* Trading countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in the region 
stimulated their export diversification. Although agricultural exports from the region 
benefited much more from diversification, the total exports of manufactured products 
which were attracting huge amounts of FDI in the late 1980s were increasing rapidly. “The 
growth of Latin America’s total exports of manufacturers rose by an annual average rate of 
16.8 per cent from 1970 to 1990, increasing their share in total exports from 10.6 per cent to 
over 30 per cent”'  ^(See App. D, Tables 2, 4). Nevertheless, although intra-Latin American 
trade corresponded to 27 per cent of the region’s total exports of manufacturers in 1990, the 
exports were only about 10 per cent of the region’s imports, more than 40 per cent of which 
came from the USA (See App. D, Tables 2, 4).^°
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6.2.2.2 MNCs and FDI
MNCs strengthened some specific industrial sectors in the continent during the debt 
crisis of the 1980s.^’ For instance, MNCs’ share in total Mexican exports realized by 
private sector in 1982 was 42 percent, which rose to 65 percent in 1 9 8 7 Foreign capital 
brought by the MNCs operated with both private and state-controlled capitals Latin 
American FDI experiences show that states and their organizations are important 
determinants of economic policy implementations. Controls on capital inflows imposed by 
states have different objectives on economic policies such as national development, fiscal 
and monetary policies, taxes, exchange rate policies, technological developments etc..^ '* In 
relation with that, MNCs have different objectives and different patterns of FDI policies in 
different regions. The policy differentials depend not only on the importance of raw 
materials or products produced in the host countries but also on the capacity and ability of 
the host country’s negotiation power with the MNCs.^^
6.3 The Results of Policy Changes on FDI During 1990-1996
At the beginning of 1990s, Chile established a strong regime and policy for 
controlling FDI in the country and foreign borrowing by its residents. Regulations 
concerning FDI encouraged long-term investment. The Mexican regime’s main objective 
was to control foreign ownership in the country. Although foreign investment liberalization 
in 1989 relaxed the restrictions on foreign ownership, the government never gave up 
protecting national sectors from foreign ownership.^^ In Brazil, the government has 
maintained a triple alliance with the local and foreign capitals since the early 1980s. The 
restrictions on FDI in Brazil were much smoother than those in the other countries in Latin 
America.
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Between 1990 and 1992, the capital inflows in many Latin American countries, 
accompanied by trade liberalization, increased rapidly as compared to the period of 1980 
and 1989. Even EDI flowed into the countries which were suffering from serious 
macroeconomic imbalances. The increased capital inflows stimulated a hyperinflation 
expectations by raising money supply and spending. However, because of currency 
appreciation which kept import cost down, inflation in the continent generally continued to 
fall.^’ Annual average of capital flows in the late 1980s were $ 8 billion. Between 1991- 
1992, the average rose to $ 50 billion. Especially, Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Colombia 
were very successful to lower their inflation rates since they adopted tight monetary policies
in order to decrease their external deficits to sustainable levels.28
The annual growth with annually 2.3 percent and economic recovery were more 
unstable and slower in Latin America as compared to the other regions in the world in the 
early 1990s.^  ^ Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela succeeded high growth rates, 
ranging from 7 per cent to over 10 percent and absorbed steady amounts of EDI in this 
period, whereas Brazil suffered from unstable growth and fluctuated EDI i n f l o w s . “Chile 
and Colombia had achieved their growth and stability by the mid-1980s, i.e. before the 
resurgence of capital inflows of the early 1990s” '^. Chile and Colombia sustained their own 
growths much less dependent on EDI inflows as comptired to Argentina and Mexico.
The UNCTAD Report of 1993^  ^ clearly states that the reasons of the recovery in 
Latin America in this period were the prolonged recessions in the industrialized countries, 
particularly its main trade partnership, the USA and a sudden and marked reversal of capital 
movements in the world. “The behavior of total EDI flows over the last decade: very rapid 
increases from 1979 through 1981; strong declines from 1982 through 1985; and then 
increases from 1986 through 1990.”^^  At Appendix D, the Table 7 of EDI flows of
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developed countries indicates that developed countries after the 1985 slightly increased FDI 
flows into the outward regions, especially by 1989, the flows to the outward were stimulated 
rapidly;^“* adoption of strict monetary, macroeconomic and liberalization policies 
implemented by Latin American governments; and success of privatization policies. The 
declining interest rates in the USA increased the net return on investment in productive 
assets in the region. Together with the reversal of capital movements in the world and 
success of privatization policies, FDI inflows through transnational firms were stimulated 
immediately in the early 1990s. The relaxation of FDI constraints and trade liberalization 
presented homelike and suitable conditions for the inflows. These facts, all together, 
explain the increase in FDI inflows to Turkey and Latin America after 1989. Latin 
American countries were highly affected by all the crises in USA, their main trade partner. 
Those crises of USA did not affect Turkey that much, however, since Turkey had another 
important trade partner, the European Union.
The UNCTAD Report of 1993^  ^ classified Latin American countries in 4 groups 
with respect to their performance during the 1990s:
1) those which had turned around recession to recovery (Pern and Brazil)
2) those with accelerating rates of growth (Bolivia, Columbia and Paraguay)
3) those with declining rates of growth (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay)
4) those which moved into recession (Mexico and Venezuela)
After 1993, Brazil entered the expansionary period in terms of output and FDI 
inflows. The countries in the second and third groups showed poorer performance in the 
context of growth as compared to 1990-1992 period. The fourth group countries, although 
they experienced an amazing recovery period, moved into a serious recession period.
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The trend towards recovery and disinflation strengthened in 1995. Like the rest of 
the developing world, a certain pattern of growth was observed in Latin American countries 
even if it had been unstable. In this period, exports have increased on account of intra- 
regional trade, a high growth rate was achieved in the continent (See App. D, Table 6). 
However, a rise in deficits in current account has emerged. Although hyperinflation was 
controlled in the end, it was highly dependent on the stability of the nominal exchange
rate.36
The growths of both Argentina and Mexico were export-led: “In Mexico, 
devaluation played a key role whereas in Argentina the expansion of exports largely resulted 
from a rise of the real exchange rate in Brazil”^^ . The expansion of Brazil and Argentina 
helped the recovery of Uruguay. The strengthening of the regional trade not only stimulated 
the growth in the economies but also encouraged the intra-regional investment flows. 
Particularly in agro-industrial sectors, Brazilian, Argentina and Chile firms have made a 
huge amounts of investments in each country and the continent.^* Between 1990 and 1994, 
intra-Mercosur exports and imports as a share of those increased significantly (See App. D, 
Table 6).^  ^ “The most rapidly growing products in intra-Mercosur trade are capital- 
intensive goods that members have not been able to export competitively to outside 
markets”“*®.
The region has continued to absorb large amounts of FDI since 1990 (See App. D, 
Table 5).“*' The FDI inflows could not be converted into manufactured, skill and technology 
intensive exports except Brazil. In the continent, most of the countries’ exports still depend 
on raw materials (See App. D, Table 4).“*^ In other words, the trade liberalization and the 
dismantling of import substitution regimes have not brought about the countries in the 
continent into the international economy in the context of export ability and diversification
since the late 1970.43
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Between 1990 and 1996, the capital flows to Latin America reached an annual 
average of $44 billion.“'^  Since the international debt crisis of 1982, the increased capital 
inflows represented a significant turning point (See App. D, Table 5). “Although most of 
the countries in the region benefited from capital inflows, these flows were concentrated in 
only a few countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chile”“*^ (See App D, Table 5). 
However, during the 1990-1996 period, the Mexican crisis of December 1994 decreased the 
capital flows for half a year. Although the countries in the region were affected in different 
degrees, the governments in the continent adopted tight monetary and fiscal policies in order 
to avoid low growth rates, hyperinflation, high unemployment rates and lack of capital 
inflows.“*^ Because of high intra-regional exports, volunteer economic solidarity in the 
continental level and a good agricultural harvest in the region“*^ the crisis did not damage the 
economies as expected (See App. D, Tables 2, 5, 8). As capital inflows revived in the mid- 
1995, most of the countries in the region except Mexico and Venezuela turned into their
economic levels before the crisis.'48
6.4 Conclusion
Since 1945, FDI has always been a motor force for growth of Latin American 
countries. Although the nature of FDI structure was changed in time, the countries in the 
continent have found a way to attract capital inflows every time. During the 1970s, the 
private banks in the industrialized banks and USA’s MNCs stimulated capital inflows into 
Latin America. By the beginning of the early 1970s, the countries had made many 
structural policy changes in their economies and legislation. As a result, at the end of the 
1980s, together with the reversal of capital movements in the world, “Latin American 
countries, like the other developing countries in the world, have been major recipients of 
FDI, and the lion’s share of manufacturing exports of developing countries to developed
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countries has come from these countries”'*’ (See App. D, Table 7). However, although the 
intra-regional trade has been increasing rapidly since 1980 in the context of manufacturing 
export, most of the Latin American countries are still relying on raw materials and primary 
products for their export earnings (See App. D, Tables 3, 4).
Macroeconomic stability seems to be a more significant determinant of FDI inflows 
than regional integration. However, the Mercosur case illustrates that comprehensive 
integration may stimulate capital inflows into the member countries as long as economic.
political and social barriers are removed completely.50
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
There is a sharp difference in FDI policies of the 1980s as compared to those of the 
previous years. From the Second World War to the mid-1970s, the MNCs established 
subsidiaries in both developing and developed countries. Although the 1970s witnessed a 
rapid expansion of international investment in developing countries, private bank lending 
grew much more rapidly than FDI. However, such a borrowing system increased foreign 
short term debts and many developing countries, most of which implemented ISI strategy 
for growth instead of export-led growth, could not pay their debts on time because of 
insufficient foreign currency stocks. In addition to that, economic crisis in the USA 
decreased the net return on investment and consequently increased the return in the 
developing countries. Therefore, a variety of new forms of FDI has come to play an 
important role in developing-developed relations. This new FDI policy was highly 
dependent on globalisation, liberalization, and openness to world-economy together with 
joint international business ventures, various international contractual arrangements and 
removal of all trade barriers.
At the beginning of the 1980s, most governments of developing countries shifted 
their industrialization strategy for growth to export-led growth strategy and paid new 
attention to the private FDI in their economies. This is because many developing countries 
desired to mitigate the external debt problem by attracting more private foreign investment, 
to transfer technology and managerial skills, and to generate taxable income for their 
balance of payments. The developed countries began to invest their current account surplus 
into developing countries as FDI inflows. For example, Japan and Asian Newly
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Industrialized Countries (NICs) invested their current account surplus into developing 
countries as FDI inflows. As Cem Somel emphasized, between 1983 and 1990, the rate of 
FDI increase became three times larger than that of export increase and four times larger 
than that of total world output increase.' MNCs, in that context, were the primary actors in 
both FDI inflows and outflows and export and import affairs in the host countries.
To find out the determinants of FDI and its effects on Turkey and other developing 
countries, we examined alternative theories. First of all we presented two international 
theories which affected FDI; Theories of Comparative Advantage and Factor Endowment. 
The former claims that each nation has a comparative advantage in the production of a 
commodity, even though another nation has an absolute advantage in the production of 
some other commodity. The latter states that trade exists since countries have different 
endowments of the factors of production. In addition to these we summarised four theories 
of FDI; International Product Cycle Theory, Internationalization, The Eclectic Theory of 
International Product, and finally Dependencia and Neo-Imperialists. Among the four we 
made use of the last one mostly. This theory looks for an explanation of the problem of 
underdevelopment by giving reference to the unequal exchange between the developing and 
the developed.
Having summarized the FDI developments in the world, we can present the findings 
of this study. In this study we have attempted to examine Turkey’s FDI experiences during 
1980-1995 and to compare these experiences with those of the Latin American region. In 
order to have a comparative perspective we have also discussed FDI experiences of both 
Turkey and Latin American region during 1950-1979. The two regions experienced the 
same macroeconomic imbalances, FDI policies and industrialization strategy until the debt 
crisis of the 1980s. Both of them were highly dependent on the dynamic synchronization 
with those of the developed countries. By the early 1970s, constraints on the autonomy of
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FDI were implemented to prevent the socio-economic costs and a set of legal guidelines 
were enacted although they needed foreign capital and technology for their growths. Until 
the late 1970s, the region adopted Dependencia School’s policies. However, such a policy 
could not be realized in Turkey since Turkey’s social, economic and political experiences 
and class relations in both state and society were somewhat different from those in the Latin 
American region. For instance, even though there was landlordship in Turkey, it was not in 
the scale of Latin American plantations. Moreover, the national bourgeoisie class, who 
produced for the internal market, in Turkey, unlike the bourgeoisie class in Latin America, 
struggled against the comprador bourgeoisie and foreign capitalists. After 1980, they both 
implemented open-door policies, suffered from the macroeconomic imbalances, and 
increased their export ability in the secondary and tertiary products through intra-regional 
trade and economic blocks. During the 1980s, neither could attract huge amounts of FDI 
inflows. However, in the late 1980s, the similarities between Turkey and Latin American 
region disappeared in the context of both economic sense and FDI inflows. Many countries 
in the continent established a consensus between local and foreign capital. That is, while 
MNCs were strengthening some specific industrial sectors, local capital was investing in the 
rest of the sectors, i^atin American FDI experiences show that states and their organizations 
are important determinants of economic policy implementations. The governments in the 
continent adopted tight monetary and fiscal policies in order to avoid low growth rates, 
hyperinflation, high unemployment rates and lack of capital inflows. On the other hand, the 
governments in Turkey neither worked towards such a consensus nor implemented tight 
macroeconomic policies against imbalances since the 1970s although some rare attempts 
had appeared. Additionally, there did not exist a consensus between local and foreign 
capital. It is a fact that Latin American countries formed volunteer economic solidarity in 
the continental level during the 1980s and this solidarity increased the possibility of the 
successes in the national level. The FDI inflows and the regional economies have been 
much more stable than those in Turkey since the late 1980s. The reasons of this
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diversification between Turkey and Latin American region after the late 1980s are the 
serious Latin American governments which implemented their political and economic 
decisions without depending on external effects, the strong economic and politic solidarity 
among many countries in the region and the closer attention to the region from the great 
economic powers in the world.
Although we discussed Turkey’s FDI experiences in the period between 1980 and 
1995 in detail, the period between 1950 and 1979 was also analyzed because we have to 
know the historical background of FDI including data supports before the intended period 
was presented. The earlier period--as presented above-attracted low FDI inflows. Most of 
the existing inflows was channelled to the manufacturing sector such as chemicals, 
transportation and vehicles, electrical machinery equipment since ISI strategy gave 
importance to the development of domestic market and the market needed manufacturing 
goods. The low FDI inflows fluctuated in some years of this period. The reasons of the 
fluctuations can be linked to the crisis in the world and political environments of the 
country. In this period, the USA, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Switzerland 
accounted for the largest shares in total FDI inflows to Turkey.
In the early 1980s, Turkey shifted its industrialization strategy to the export-led 
growth strategy since the military and its civil partners aimed to integrate Turkey into the 
US dominated capitalist system and to change structures of the society and class relations 
into new ones. In the economic sense, these powers needed foreign currency, new 
technology and new managerial skills to improve macroeconomic imbalances. It is clear 
that Turkey had shifted its growth strategy two or three years ago as the other developing 
countries did. In other words, Turkey had an advantage in the context of experiences. 
However, Turkey could not use this advantage efficiently because of unskilled governments 
and bureaucracy.
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Between 1980 and 1990, due to the high volume of exports to the ME countries, 
low wages, weak domestic demands and high external credits in the country, Turkey had a 
higher growth rate than the OECD average. In that period, Turkey’s export was mainly to 
the EC and the ME countries. Turkey’s export to EC concentrated primarily on textile, 
clothing and leather products which are labor-intensive ones and that to the ME 
concentrated mainly on iron and steel, non-electric, transportation vehicles, and plastics and 
rubber products which are primarily capital-intensive ones and food which is labor-intensive 
one (See App. B, Tables 13 and 15). It should also be remembered that EDI and technology 
inflows to Turkey were mostly in the manufacturing sectors, especially textile, iron and 
\ steel, transportation vehicles, and chemicals sub-sectors (See App. B, Tables 1-5). 
Therefore, we have concluded that EDI inflows affected the nature of exports in the context 
of both labor-intensive and capital-intensive products but much more on the latter. In this 
respect, we should consider EDI firms’ export ability. Then, it is understood that these 
firms focused mainly on transportation vehicles, metal products and cement and soil product 
exports. Thus, the share of the EDI firms’ exports to the annual total export was about 5 
percent in this period (See App. B, Tables 8 and 9). It is clear that the EDI firms were 
dealing with the internal market and the ME countries to export capital-intensive products 
instead of exporting them to the developed countries. The firms’ contributions to Turkey’s 
total export were negligible except the export of transportation vehicles. In other words, the 
firms did not convert EDI inflows into the export outflows. It is a fact that the main 
exporters to the ME countries and the EC in the period were the various public enterprises 
and private sector, respectively. Turkey, although it could not form intra-regional groups 
with its regional neighbours as in the case of Latin America, increased its export of 
manufactured goods by selling them to the underdeveloped countries of the region. Its 
export in 1980s, however, remained mainly dependent on the primary goods, just as in 
Latin America.
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As in the previous period, Turkey’s export was also mainly to the EC and the ME 
countries between 1990 and 1995. Like the previous period, the various public enterprises 
and private sectors were still the main exporters to the ME and the EC. Turkey’s export to 
the EC concentrated primarily on textile, clothing and leather products which are labor- 
intensive ones and that of Turkey to the ME concentrated mainly on iron and steel, textile 
and food which are either capital-intensive or labor-intensive ones (See App., B, Table 14 
and 16). When compared with the previous period, more labor-intensive products have 
been exported to the ME. Here, it may be asked whether the nature of Turkey’s export 
products to the ME has transformed from the capital-intensive products to the labor- 
intensive products or the reverse has occurred by EDI inflows and the implementation of 
high-technology. When we look at the EDI inflows of this period, the EDI share of the 
manufacturing sector has decreased until 1992, and increased suddenly after 1993 (See 
App., B, Tables 5, 11, and 12). The reason of the sudden increase was the huge EDI inflows 
into the transportation vehicles sub-sector. At the same time, there was not a significant 
amount of EDI inflow and technology transfer to the food and textiles sub-sectors. As a 
result we have observed that, as EDI inflows became more concentrated on certain capital- 
intensive products, Turkey’s exports were composed more and more of labor-intensive 
products. In other words, although Turkey’s attempts to have a semi-peripheral economic 
structure have been continuing since 1980, during the 1990s, Turkey’s economic structure 
has become even more peripheral. This structure has been supported by the capitalist 
economies such as Erance, US, the Netherlands and Japan. These economies were the main 
EDI sources for Turkey (See App., B, Table 6).
Turkey attempted to open its economy to the capitalist world without restrictions 
and enacted many laws to support this policy between 1980 and 1995. The main aim of the 
policy was to bind the structure of the economy to the capitalist economies as a peripheral
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country since there were needs for peripheral countries which would produce manufactured 
goods for the developed countries. The net benefit of the periphery would be the increased 
revenue from exports. It is a fact that Turkey has increased its export revenues since 1980 
but Turkey could not transform the nature of export products and the countries to which 
products have been exported. The labor-intensive manufactured products were being 
exported to the developing countries. Moreover, most of the FDI inflows, coming from the 
developed countries, flowed into the labor-intensive sectors and most of the capital outflows 
were inhaled from the service sectors, especially from banking and trade. In other words, 
the developed countries encouraged Turkey to adapt their old technology without making 
new R&D expenditures in order to have new rents from the technology adaptation. The 
reason behind this manufactured-product-technology transfer was that the economic and 
social costs of those manufactured products were substantially higher when compared with 
the cost of high-tech products. Although some countries such as Brazil were transformed 
to semi-peripheral countries with this technology transfer, some others, because of lack of 
infrastructure and unavailable conjectures in the world economy, remained as peripheral 
countries, even though they attempted to become semi-peripheries at the beginning. Turkey 
is an example to the latter.
Endnotes
l,vÜretimde Küreselleşme ve Kalkinma,” Toplum ve Bilim. 69, (1996), 85.
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APPENDIX A
Table 1: Sectoral Distribution of Foreign Capital Permits (1980-1995)
Years Manufacturing Agriculture Mining Services TOTAL Actual
US$ mil % US$
mil
% us$
mil
% US$ mil % US$ mil Inflow
1980 88,76 91,51 0 0 0 0 8,24 8,49 97 35
1981 246,54 73,05 0,86 0,25 0,98 0,29 89,13 26,41 337,51 141
1982 98,54 59,01 1,06 0,63 1,97 1,18 65,43 39,18 167 103
1983 88,93 86,56 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02 13,76 13,39 102,74 87
1984 185,92 68,51 5,93 2,19 0,25 0,09 79,26 29,21 271,36 162
1985 142,89 60,94 6,37 2,72 4,26 1.8 2 80,97 34,53 234,49 158
1986 193,47 53,15 16,86 4,63 0,86 0,24 152,81 41,98 364 170
1987 293,91 44,86 13 1,98 1,25 0,19 347,08 52,97 655,24 239
1988 490,68 59,8 27,35 3,33 5,62 0,68 296,87 36,18 820,52 488
1989 950,13 62,84 9,36 11,86 0,78 540,59 35,75 1.511.94 855
1990 1214,06 65,23 65,56 3,52 47,09 2,53 534,45 28,72 1.861.16 1,005
1991 1095,48 55,69 22,41 1,14 39,82 2,02 809,55 41,15 1.967.26 1,041
1992 1274,28 70,02 33,59 0,5 18,96 1,04 493,13 27,1 1.819.96 1,242
1993 1580,3 74,37 31,21 1,47 11,77 0,55 501,71 23,61 2.124.99 1,016
1994 1106,23 74,51 29,32 1,97 6,2 0,42 342,91 23,1 1.484.66 830
1995 1.996,48 67,95 31,74 1,08 60,62 2,06 849,48 28,91 2.938.32 1250
TOTAL 11046,6 65,92 294,65 1,76 211,53 1,25 5.205,37 31 16.758,15 8,822
Sources: The New Investment Environment in Turkey. (Istanbul: Intermedia 1996), 49
Yabanci Sermaye Raporud993-1995). T.C. Basbakanlik Hazine Mustesarligi, 104.
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Table 2: Foreign Capital in Turkey by Years 1980-1995
Years
Foreign capital 
permits
Total of
investment
certificates
Cumulative Total for 
Companies in Operation
Number
of
companies
Total 1 
capital 1
Actual
inflow
US$ million TL billion TL million $ million
1980 97 77 78 28,39 35
1981 337 72 109 47,4 141
1982 167 218 147 100,196 103
1983 102 199 166 147,109 87
1984 271 312 235 254,775 162
1985 234 1168 408 464,981 158
1986 364 3100 619 707 170
1987 655 3180 836 960,035 239
1988 820 5468 1172 1597,103 488
1989 1,511 9507 1525 4847,832 855
1990 1,811 18249 1856 7943,775 1005
1991 1,967 15894 2123 13101,036 1041
1992 1,819 17976 2330 23441,214 1242
1993 2,174 70136 2554 36737,05 1016
1994 1,484 37202 2830 964 830
1995 2,938 328448 3161 113013,79 1250
TOTAL 16,758 511208 8822
Sources: The New Investment Environment in Turkey. (Istanbul: 
Yabanci Sermaye Raporu! 1993-19951. T.C. Basbakanlik
Intermedia, 1996), 49. 
Hazine Mustesarligi, 103.
80
Table 3: Distribution of Permits Issued According to Countries (US $ million)
Countries 1980-4 1980-
5
1980-
6
1980-7 1980-8 1980-
9
1980-10 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total
France 43,08 14,92 8,31 33,11 43,71 233,42 6690,06 249 353 226 256 477 2606,4
USA 268,2 21,71 24,53 61,07 129,75 137,49 127,84 460 197 253, 157 231 2071
Germany 144,66 22,49 45,26 105,58 61 130,95 145,88 196 202 158 224 392 1869,2
Nether. 39,28 8,7 2,4 20,4 68,3 149,21 34,11 280 273 212 196 559 1842,5
Switz. 233,34 20,01 53,29 82,52 115,49 167,23 127,74 109 204 142 54,3 328 1636,1
UK 28,73 26,49 22,83 102,61 129,65 280,72 286,41 80 110 115 51,5 161 1395.1
Italy 22,4 0,1 4,83 6,09 40,58 74,2 65,86 180 120 420 164 98,5 1196,2
Japan 0,05 3,45 2,63 111,53 69,18 73,78 102,71 54 36,6 237 126 284 1101,3
S. Arabia 4,95 4,36 75,77 7,27 17,32 11,05 4,63 43 34 15 8,4 11,8 238,7
Canada 7,52 0 5,54 0,58 9,76 6,21 2,24 51 23 58 37 41,3 242,7
Belgiunn 13,99 0,16 17,12 4,5 3,85 29,85 18,07 8,27 20 21 13,4 36,2 186,5
S. Korea 0 0 0,2 1,65 0,48 1,01 17,25 0,94 10,3 93,3 0,5 15,9 141,5
Bahrain 3,33 6 0,95 0,04 1,07 0,58 4,35 6,92 50 25,9 11,9 6,4 117,2
Denmark 21,36 6,9 4,67 2,05 0,58 31,64 15,76 4,73 3,66 5,21 8,5 3,6 108,7
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0,05 29,73 25,83 9,67 14 15 1,3 18,1 113,8
Sweden 0,66 0,85 1,03 6,88 3,97 12,01 15,65 14 15 6,25 8,7 11,8 96,1
Iran 12,59 2,78 7,09 8,03 11,17 12,07 5,48 3,23 9 5,8 4 5,6 86,7
IFC 4,46 0 0 2,13 0,7 5,86 8,57 6,09 10,5 1,7 21 9,7 70,7
Panama 0,89 0,67 20,36 2,06 16,1 3,73 3,02 1,74 2,6 3,58 2,11 17,5 74,3
Austria 2,82 0,16 0,9 1,06 4,85 8,15 6,53 8 8,9 5,55 3,5 32,9 83,7
UAE 16,06 0 4,64 1,03 3,14 3,68 6,04 8,04 0,3 3,39 0,31 0,2 46,8
Syria 4,42 1,7 1,71 2,65 5,53 4,21 11,13 3,56 0,99 2,69 1,9 1,4 41,7
Others 102,82 93,04 59,94 92,4' 43,68 105,17 157 185 123 100 133 195 1390,2
TOTAL 975,61 234,49 364 655,24 820,52 1511,9 1861,16 1967 1819 2124 1484 2938 16758
Sources: The New Investment Environment in Turkey. (Istanbul: Intermedia 1996), 50.
Yabanci Sermaye Rapomd993-1995). T.C. Basbakanlik Hazine Mustesarligi, 105.
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APPENDIX B
Table 1: Sectoral Distribution of Authorized FDI, 1980-1995
Sector Total
Author.
Capital
New Investment Sector Share
(in million $) (%)
Manufacturing (Total) 10375,39 2505,21 66
Food & Beyerages 1476,5 270,02 9,34
Tobacco 364,96 239,52 2,31
Textile & Clothing 392,15 112,15 2,48
Paper, Print 174 43,89 1,10
Rubber 298,09 1,13 1,89
Plastic 158,6 29,41 1,00
Chemicals 1756,06 186,64 11,11
Glass 75,8 33,23 0,48
Transport. Vehicles 2554,26 788,3 16,16
Aeroplane 231,59 145,81 1,46
Metal Products 226,92 130,01 1,44
Iron & Steel 562,29 162,25 3,56
Machinery 53,09 13,42 0,34
Elect. Machinery 
and Electronics
1058,62 156,12 6,70
Cement & Soil Pro. 751,69 29,72 4,75
Other Manufacturing 231,8 113,59 1,47
Agriculture 269,48 84,76 1,70
Mining 188,6 54,76 1,19
Services 4795,12 2431,73 30,33
Tourism 1534,49 822,25 9,71
Banking 768,76 205,32 4,86
Trade 807,2 379,28 5,11
Other Services 1765,87 845,88 11,17
TOTAL 15808,58 5026,36 100,00
Sources: Türkiye'de Yabanci Sermaye. State Plan Organization. n98S· 1987. 19901. 13-22. 
Yabanci Sermaye RaporuC 1990-1992'). T.C. Başbakanlık Hazine Mustesarligi, 
23,27,31, 35,39,43.
Yabanci Sermaye Raporud993-19951. T.C. Başbakanlık Hazine Mustesarligi, 107, 
114,121.
Turkey Main Economic Indicators. State Planning Organization,(1997), 73,74.
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Table 2: Sectoral Distribution of Authorized FDI, 1980-1983
Sector Total
Author.
Capital
New
Investment
Sector Share
(in million $) (%)
Manufacturing (Total) 522,77 142,28 74
Food & Beyerages 72,13 10,69 10,24
Textile & Clothing 50,33 7,85 7,15
Paper,Print, 14,83 10,91 2,11
Rubber 7 0 0,99
Plastic 6,42 0 0,91
Chemicals 47,72 2,9 6,78
Transportai. Vehic. 93,49 18,76 13,28
Metal Products 14,86 4,62 2,11
Iron & Steel 3,96 12,71 0,56
Machinery 19,99 4,59 2,84
Elect. Machinery 
and Electronics
96,01 49,6 13,63
Cement & Soil Pro. 38,43 6,25 5,46
Other Manufacturing 25,96 14 3,69
Agriculture 1,95 1,06 0,28
Mining 2,97 0,77 0,42
Services 176,56 124,62 25,07
Tourism 62,26 42,91 8,84
Banking 65,96 37 9,37
Other Seryices 48,34 44,71 6,86
TOTAL 704,25 269,33 100,00
Source; Türkiye'de Yabanci Sermaye. State Plan Organization, (1983), 13-26.
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Table 3: Sectoral Distribution of Authorized FDI, 1984-1986
Sector Total Author. 
Capital
New Investment Sector Share
(in million $) (%)
Manufacturing (Total) 522,28 303,63 60,04
Food & Beyerages 66,37 18,75 7,63
Textile & Clothing 19,01 4,66 2,19
Paper,Print, 0,57 0,05 0,07
Rubber 7,89 0 0,91
Plastic 4,02 0,66 0,46
Chemicals 93,03 69,48 10,69
Transport. Vehicles 41,99 4,2 4,83
Metal Products 7,63 0,66 0,88
Iron & Steel 69,99 55,58 8,05
Machinery 13,45 0,07 1,55
Elect. Machinery 
and Electronics
63,62 18,17 7,31
Cement & Soil Pro. 0,51 0,51 0,06
Other Manufacturing 10,01 7,1 1,15
Agriculture 29,16 17,03 3,35
Mining 5,38 0,32 0,62
Services 313,04 242,93 35,99
Tourism 64,5 57,91 7,41
Banking 101,05 52,25 11,62
Trade 49,83 41,36 5,73
Other Seryices 97,76 91,41 11,24
TOTAL 869,86 563,91 100,00
Source: Türkiye'de Yabanci Sermaye. State Plan Organization, (1987), 17-21, 26.
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Table 4: Sectoral Distribution of Authorized FDI, 1987-1989
Sector Total
Author.
Capital
New Investment Sector Share
(in million $) (%)
Manufacturing (Total) 1658,88 410,4 58,59
Food & Beverages 183,24 45,19 6,47
Textile &. Clothing 112,24 28,8 3,96
Paper,Print, 112,8 18,2 3,98
Rubber 112 0,28 3,96
Plastic 15,4 10,25 0,54
Glass 295 47,3
Chemicals 46,8 25,8 1,65
Transportât. Vehic. 202,1 76 7,14
Aeroplane 36,9 0 1,02
Metal Products 35,3 16,7 2,47
Iron & Steel 138,4 76,9 4,89
Machinery 5,35 3,5 0,19
Elect. Machinery 
and Electronics
104,33 31,5 3,68
Cement&Soil Pro. 200,6 5,32 7,08
Other Manufact. 34,54 21,6 1,22
Agriculture 43,81 10,5 1,55
Mining 22,67 8,4 0,80
Services 1106,05 707,1 39,06
Tourism 508,2 400,3 17,95
Banking 86,3 25,2 3,05
Trade 172,8 75,2 6,10
Other Services 338,5 206 11,96
TOTAL 2831,41 1136,17 100,00
Source: Main Economic Indicators. State Planning Organization. (1990'). 14. 16, 18.
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Table 5: Sectoral Distribution of FDI Stock
Year 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995
Sector (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Manufacturing (Total) 87,25 67,9 51,21 50,58 54,36 62,68
Food & Beverages 11,57 10,23 9,47 7,07 11,77 7,85
Textile & Clothing 3,88 7,01 2,84 2,83 2,26 1,63
Paper,Print, 0,51 2,36 0,54 3,77 1,4 0,25
Rubber 5,52 1,79 0,84 1,59 2,21 1,63
Plastic 0,04 0,29 0,53 0,47 1,77 1,43
Glass 2,34 2,6 1,07 0,73 0,54 0,12
Transportât. Vehic. 18,05 10,87 10,03 4,99 9,64 36,78
Aeroplane n.a. n.a. 0,08 n.a. 1,66 1,59
Metal Products 4,51 3,1 1,23 0,53 1,94 0,25
Iron & Steel n.a. 2,93 3,27 4,17 3,65 0,09
Machinery 3,68 2,32 3,36 0,71 0,16 0,14
Elect. Machinery 
and Electronics
24,8 6,01 7,2 8,82 6,49 8,99
Cement & Soil Pro. 0,87 2,66 0,58 0,25 1,88 0,29
Other Manufacturing 1,06 4,09 0,72 1,21 1,75 1,63
Agriculture 0,01 2,43 2,9 2,22 2,73 1,27
Mining 0,21 0,7 1,08 1,02 1,75 2,45
Services 12,53 28,07 44,81 45,88 41,66 33,60
Tourism 3,99 4,71 6,45 12,06 8,73 7,11
Banking 8,39 12,43 18,07 8,17 9,02 3,39
Trade n.a. n.a. 5,99 11,25 5,15 4,62
Other Services 0,15 11,83 14,3 14,41 18,25 18,47
TOTAL 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Sources: Türkiye'de Yabanci Sermaye. State Plan Organization, (1983, 1987, 1990), 13-22. 
Yabanci Sermaye Raporud990-19921. T.C. Basbakanlik Hazine Mustesarligi, 43. 
Turkey Main Economic Indicators. State Planning Organization,(1997), 73,74. 
Yabanci Sermaye Raporu( 1993-1995). T.C. Basbakanlik Hazine Mustesarligi, 121.
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Table 6: Source Country Distribution of Authorized FDI
Source
Country
1980-1983 1984-1986 1987-1989 1990-1992 1990-1995
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Belgium 0 3,05 1,38 0,80 2,93
Denmark 1,72 2,4 1,23 0,43 0,27
France 5,37 2,56 12,22 22,56 14,61
Germany 19,48 8,65 9,84 9,66 11,80
Italy 1,47 1.91 5,15 6,49 10,40
Japan n.a. 0,7 6,5 3,44 9,86
Netherlands 2,65 2,66 5,33 11,25 14,74
Saudi Arabia 0,43 9,32 1,26 1,47 0,54
Switzerland 32,09 9,27 13,17 7,80 7,99
UK 3,48 6,15 15,05 8,35 4,99
USA 13,8 24,98 11,01 13,95 12,02
Other 18,84 12,25 17,45 13,7 9,85
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: Türkiye'de Yabanci Sermaye. State Plan Organization, (1983), 33, 35, 37.
Türkiye'de Yabanci Sermaye. State Plan Organization, (1987), 14, 18,22. 
Yabanci Sermaye Raporud990-19921. T.C. Basbakanlik Hazine Mustesarligi, 
17,19,22.
Turkey Main Economic Indicators. State Planning Organization,(1997), 75.
Table 7: Foreign Direct Inyestment Moyements (million $)
Years Authorized
FDI
Capitalized
Profits
Net FDI Profit
Transfers
1980 97 35 35 10
1981 338 141 141 9
1982 167 103 103 15
1983 103 87 87 23
1984 271 162 162 16
1985 235 158 158 52
1986 364 170 170 40
1987 655 239 171 47
1988 821 488 406 42
1989 1512 855 738 112
1990 1861 1005 789 102
1991 1967 1041 910 119
1992 1820 1242 912 124
1993 2063 1016 797 162
1994 1477 830 637 140
1995 2938 1250 935 183
TOTAL 16689 8822 7151 1196
Sources: Yabanci Sermaye Raporuf 1990-19921. '.C. Basbakanlik Hazine Mustesarligi, 9.
Yabanci Sermaye Raporu( 1993-1995). T.C. Basbakanlik Hazine Mustesarligi, 103. 
Main Economic Indicators. State Planning Organization, (1997), 73.
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Table 8: Manufactured Exports by EDI Firms, 1985-1992 (million $)
Sectors 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Food,
Beverages,
Tobacco
40,55 53,63 50,37 57,03 167,89 182,34 207,31 94,37
Textile,
Clothing
15,62 11,78 15,89 15,83 35,68 47,94 46,57 38,8
Plastic,
Rubber
1,14 1,25 1,37 1,18 16,28 11,64 51,55 46
Chemicals 5,22 9,11 11,36 21,85 72,64 68,84 119,46 78,88
Transportation
Vehicles
38,42 33,7 7,68 12,01 29,96 59,35 116,45 153,04
Iron & Steel 0 0,49 0,06 0 4,07 43,19 76,12 74,87
Metal Products 0,65 1,4 35,5 55,84 44,23 30,24 9,77 1,72
Machinery
Electrical
3,36 2,15 11,04 55,21 9,26 12,56 30,65 22,81
Machinery & 
Electronics
0,62 1,02 0,57 7,44 12,98 47,83 83,61 98,44
Glass, Cement 
& Soil Products
12,27 6,65 11,63 12,77 16,66 38,47 19,43 21,33
Others 1 6,44 1,35 1,67 2,73 5,28 5,9 3,97
Total 118,85 127,62 145,12 235,22 414,88 550,81 772,31 635,5
Source: Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade, Unpublished Data, 1992.
Table 9: Shares of Manufactured Exports by Large EDI Firms (%)
Year
Share ofFDI 
Firms exports 
in FDI Sales
Share of 
domestic 
firms exports 
in their sales
Share of export 
in sales for the 
500 largest firm
FDI Firms 
share 
in total 
Exports
FDI Share 
in Total 
Sales
Share of FDI 
firms in 
Turkey's total 
annual export
1984 12,02 11,56 11,62 11,54 13,95 4,92
1985 8,67 10,66 10,37 42,79 14,9 4,67
1986 5,61 10,18 9,04 15,34 24,9 5,7
1987 9,42İ 10,56 10,36 15,64 17,04 5,77
1988 18,58 12,29 13,31 21,2 16,29 9,08
1989 13,11 12,42 12,56 21,83 20,91 10,56
1990 11,24 9,63 9,98 22,36 21,84 10,08
1991 6,61 11,6 9,87 23,09 34,71 10,13
Source: Yilmaz, Ayla. Turkey’s Foreign Direct Investment Experience During 1980-1992 
Period with Special Reference to Manufactured Exports. Unpublished Master’s 
dissertation. Department of Economics, METU, 1993, 117.
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Table 10: The Ratios of FDI to GNP and to GDP between 1980 and 1995
Years FDI Inflows GNP GDP FDI/GN
P
FDI/GD
P
($ million) ($ million) ($ million)
1980 97 68390,6 67457 0,14% 0,14%
1981 338 71504 70419,1 0,47% 0,48%
1982 167 64209,2 63485,1 0,26% 0,26%
1983 103 60491,5 60373,4 0,17% 0,17%
1984 271 59098,2 58643,4 0,46% 0,46%
1985 235 66890,6 66408,3 0,35% 0,35%
1986 364 75173,3 75018,5 0,48% 0,49%
1987 655 85979,2 85638,2 0,76% 0,76%
1988 821 90460 90494,6 0,91% 0,91%
1989 1512 107544,5 106122,5 1,41% 1,42%
1990 1861 150757,8 149195 1,23% 1,25%
1991 1967 150176,8 149155,6 1,31% 1,32%
1992 1820 158156,2 156655,8 1,15% 1,16%
1993 2063 169935,3 168356,1 1,21% 1,23%
1994 1477 164856,4 163843,9 0,90% 0,90%
1995 2938 171122,7 169467,7 1,72% 1,73%1
GNP, GDP and FDI values are at current prices
Sources: Yabanci Sermave Raporud993-1995). T.C. Basbakanlik Flazine Mustesarligi, 103. 
Gross National Product. Concept. Methods, and Sources. State Institue of Statistics 
Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, (1994), 67-70.
Turkey Main Economic Indicators. State Planning Organization,(1997), 13-15.
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Table 11: Sectoral Distribution of Authorized FDI, 1990-1992 (in million $)
Sector Total Author. 
Capital
Sew Investment Sector Share
Manufacturing (Total) 3583,42 972,67 63,48%
Food & Beverages 493,96 77,39 8,75%
Tobacco 256,45 233,9 4,54%
Textile & Clothing 108,23 43,76 1,92%
Paper, Print 28,79 11,23 0,51%
Rubber 39,43 0,05 0,70%
Plastic 61,55 9,25 1,09%
Chemicals 528,18 34,96 9,36%
Glass 13,71 0,38 0,24%
Transportai. Vehicles 662,27 322,3 11,73%
Aeroplane 57,56 22,52 1,02%
Metal Products 139,44 102,98 2,47%
Iron & Steel 238,44 6,27 4,22%
Machinery 10,1 6,27 0,18%
Elect. Machinery 327,06 45,96 5,79%
and Electronics
Cement & Soil Pro. 500,26 15,64 8,86%
Other Manufacturing 117,99 39,81 2,09%
Agriculture 123,96 10,14 2,20%
Mining 105,87 34,1 1,88%
Services 1831,67 712,05 32,45%
Tourism 560,44 171,16 9,93%
Banking 306,74 60,86 5,43%
Trade 295,71 143,64 5,24%
Other Services 668,78 336,39 11,85%
TOTAL 5644,92 1728,96 100,00%
Source: Yabanci Sermaye Raporu! 1990-1992\ T.C. Basbakanlik Hazine Mustesarligi, 
23, 24,27, 28,31,32.
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Table 12: Sectoral Distribution of Authorized FDI, 1993-1995 (in million $)
Sector Total Author. 
Capital
New Investment Sector Share
Manufacturing (Total) 4088 629,51 71,00%
Food & Beverages 660,8 118 11,48%
Tobacco 108,1 3 1,88%
Textile & Clothing 100,9 27 1,75%
Paper,Print, 17,8 3 0,31%
Rubber 119,1 0,8 2,07%
Plastic 71,2 9,25 1,24%
Chemicals 791,8 32 13,75%
Glass 10,1 7 0,18%
Transportât. Vehic. 1553,6 367 26,98%
Aeroplane 13,8 0 0,24%
Metal Products 29,6 5 0,51%
Iron & Steel 83,7 11 1,45%
Machinery 4,2 2,46 0,07%
Elect. Machinery 
and Electronics
467,6 11 8,12%
Cement & Soil Pro. 11,5 2 0,20%
Other Manufacturing 44,2 31 0,77%
Agriculture 70,6 46 1,23%
Mining 51,7 11 0,90%
Services 1547,8 645 26,88%
Tourism 339 150 5,89%
Banking 208,7 30 3,62%
Trade 288,8 119 5,02%
Other Services 612,5 167 10,64%
TOTAL 5758,1 1331,51 100,00%
Source: Yabanci Sermaye Raporun993-1995\ T.C. Basbakanlik Hazine Mustesarligi, 
107, 114,121.
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Table 13: Turkey’s Export to the European Community Countries Between 1980 and 1989
(1000 $)
Sectors 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 TOTAL
Food 61719 60667 48938 71404 56097 88607 108611 304755 212400 1013198
Chemicals 10996 15472 13233 12237 20992 24617 47852 73305 130062 348766
Plastics,Rubber 2846 4734 3452 8969 8414 14825 34673 59719 77582 215214
Leather 20829 42594 79472 109279 276631 426611 270424 530377 376830 2133047
Textiles 297411 387704 392076 383254 410739 367787 389320 386476 478351 3493118
Clothing 60109 91989 239502 389790 591429 400946 459041 680637 819631 3733074
Seramics,Glass 10538 12449 15973 20152 34707 48190 54077 73393 97110 366589
Iron,Steel 19039 16826 32063 15591 28399 39298 82444 64274 207201 505135
Non-electric 7274 11757 13000 14289 28717 182005 85391 361285 52899 756617
Electrics 1133 2767 3261 4688 8633 51275 20108 62423 85638 239926
Transport 10244 21230 14487 23578 20398 26181 23550 43690 32900 216258
Optical Instruments 40 126 114 185 118 15175 8461 10007 753 34979
TOTAL 502178 668315 855571 1053416 1485274 1685517 1583952 2650341 2571357 13055921
Source: Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade, Unpublished Data, 1998
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Table 14: Turkey's Export to the European Community Countries Between 1990 and 1995
(1000$)
Sectors 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 TOTAL
Food 143816 240251 328693 312505 324665 440526 518096 2308552
Chemicals 172433 128574 99995 112529 108627 168830 180076 971064
Plastics,Rubber 100598 97914 115315 135032 134745 165009 257136 1005749
Leather 407633 580860 471903 409614 386881 327226 315515 2899632
Textiles 659976 684386 624980 522531 508210 654177 749107 4403367
Clothing 1809700 2335568 2685128 3281290 3237599 3255285 4367483 20972053
Seramics,Glass 118282 171811 169274 190919 183840 209784 265609 1309519
Iron,Steel 252110 370933 176275 202492 138118 293450 504755 1938133
Non-electric 86061 121067 113259 159701 143787 258493 354296 1236664
Electrics 161196 331411 416099 505749 390535 414476 572758 2792224
Transport 75151 71698 110973 119456 133609 198420 400282 1109589
Optical Instruments 1171 2054 4368 18199 10777 14727 14694 65990
TOTAL 3988127 5136527 5316262 5970017 5701393 6400403 8499807 41012536
Source: Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade, Unpublished Data, 1998
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Table 15: Turkey's Export to The Middle East Countries Between 1980 and 1989
(1000$)
Sectors 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 TOTAL
Food 28919 61741 156872 172483 266672 161380 88355 128444 122645 1187511
Chemicals 14072 24611 41349 44327 52331 58365 74202 148498 133413 591168
Plastics,Rubber 10369 37511 45240 56916 73080 75857 71793 141004 142296 654066
Leather 131 292 582 931 1128 743 3189 86515 16943 110454
Textiles 18432 51915 81545 98792 97121 97544 65333 43135 43484 597301
Clothing 8059 39837 37251 18883 55530 105389 56516 64082 71372 456919
Seramics,Glass 15874 53983 52255 53569 63742 78062 57635 66067 61218 502405
Iron,Steel 8019 34395 278140 347977 443144 855321 392855 431476 482813 3274140
Non-electric 13108 34144 59511 62654 47199 149532 86339 169890 125001 747378
Electrics 411 575 5855 32855 40070 44913 69331 95839 113263 403112
Transport 29502 71567 65759 78010 71218 94959 20633 32628 35976 500252
Optical Instruments 79 40 57 68 273 2021 1925 13784 6424 24671
TOTAL 146975 410611 824416 967465 1211508 1724086 988106 1421362 1354848 9049377
Source; Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade, Unpublished Data, 1998
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Table 16: Turkey's Export to The Middle East Countries Between 1990 and 1995
(1000$)
Sectors 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 TOTAL
Food 128614 89771 225706 286966 237798 311878 310198 1590931
Chemicals 93058 83100 64778 78680 52565 37391 41068 450640
Plastics,Rubber 92599 67622 108027 123288 111309 105383 104845 713073
Leather 2774 1773 2845 2611 2614 2445 1957 17019
Textiles 105509 102757 133397 172520 140407 174859 161983 991432
Clothing 73759 56552 55044 79029 82163 84764" 94388 5256~99
Seramics,GIass 44400 41547 36293 55704 44273 37962 43550 303729
Iron,Steel 433939 398467 371878 356168 384880 397339 536996 2879667
Non-electric 38735 27290 25573 49811 45864 52189 48527 287989
Electrics 48729 67469 46155 22497 55874 36775 45521 323020
Transport 12954 10548 9316 26077 33752 46636 44391 183674
Optical Instruments 1180 1434 675 1165 1435 1958 1795 9642
TOTAL 1076250 948330 1079687 1254516 1192934 1289579 1435219 8276515
Source; Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade, Unpublished Data, 1998
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APPENDIX C
Table 1: Realized FDI Inflows, 1950-1979 
(in million US $)
Year Annual FDI 
Inflow
Cumulative FDI 
Inflow
Pre-1954 2,8 2,8
1954 2,2 5
1955 1,2 6,2
1956 3,4 9,6
1957 1,3 10,9
1958 1,1 12
1959 3,4 15,4
1960 1,9 17,3
1961 1,2 18,5
1962 4,2 22.7
1963 4,5 27,2
1964 11,9 39,1
1965 11,6 50,7
1966 9,7 60,4
1967 9 69,4
1968 13,9 83,3
1969 13,2 96,5
1970 9 105,5
1971 11,7 117,2
1972 12,8 130
1973 67,3 197,3
1974 -7,7 189,6
1975 15,1 204,7
1976 8,9 213,6
1977 9,2 222,8
1978 11,7 234,5
1979 -6,4 228,1
Source: Turkey Main Economic Indicators. State Planning Organization,(1987), 10.
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Table 2: Sectoral Distribution of FDI Inflows, 1950-1974, 1975 and 1979 (in %)
1950-1974 1975 1979
Sector dumber 
of Firms
Sub-sector Share ; 
in main sector
(%)
Sector Share 
in Total
FDI(%)
Sector Share 
in Total FDI
Sector Share 
in Total FDI
Manufacturing( sum) 133 100 91,92 86,29 79,37
Food 8 8,82 8,1 6,81 5,39
Baverages 4 2,3 2,11
Textile and clothing 7 2,04 1,88 0,99 0,58
Paper 1 0,5 0,46 2,24 1,93
Rubber 5 13,82 12,71 10,22 8,83
Chemicals 31 19 17,46 13,67 11,07
Glass 1 0,13 0,12 2,09 1,8
Transportation Vec 11 18,23 16,76 23,35 22,32
Metal Products 11 4,87 4,48 3,93 9,89
Machinery 15 6,42 5,9 2,56 4,64
Electrical Machinery 
and Equipment
10 16,78 15,43 14,28 11,77
Soil,Stone Products 10 5,41 4,97 2,51 0,95
Forestry Products 1 0,09 0,08
Building Materials 1 0,02 - 0,02
Other Manufacturing 4 1,57 1,44 0,05 0,22
Agriculture 3 100 0,28 0,05 0,04
Mining 5 100 0,59 1,1 79
Services 18 100 7,21 12,56 19,8
Trade 3 6,34 0,46
Banking 2 21,55 1,55 2,37 4,36
Other Services 13 72,11 5,2 0,41 0,16
TOTAL 159( 100 1001 100
Sources: G. Uras, Türkiye'de Yabanci Sermaye Yatirimlari. (Istanbul: Formül 
Matbaasi,1979), 163-167.
Türkiye'de Yabanci Sermaye. State Planning Organization, (1983), 12, 20.
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Table 3: Source Country Distribution of FDI Inflows, 1950-1974
(in million US $)
Source Country 'dumber 
of Firms
Authorized
FDI
Realized
FDI
Country share in 
Realized FDI (%)
Austria 7 6,49 1,61 1,17
Belgium 3 1,86 0,85 0,62
Canada 2 2,88 2,35 1,7
Denmark 5 1,35 1,98 1,44
France 11 16,53 5,63 4,08
Germany 29 56,67 19,72 14,29
Israel 1 0,34 0,01 0,01
Italy 9 21,25 15,82 11,47
Kuwait 0 7,2 0 0
Netherlands 8 16,26 16,67 11,79
Pakistan 0 1,4 0 0
Spain 0 0,14 0 0
Sweden 3 3,96 0,64 0,46
Switzerland 19 32,7 14,64 10,61
UK 8 8,9 6,1 4,42
USA 41 61,98 33,28 24,12
Unified 13 46,96 19,06 13,82
TOTAL 159 286,87 137,96 100
Source: G. Uras, Türkiye'de Yabanci Sermaye Yatirimlari. (Istanbul: Formül 
Matbaasi,1979), 164, 168.
Table 4: Source Country Distribution of FDI Stocks, 1975 
(in million TL)
Source Country Vumber of 
'^irms
Authorized
FDI
Realized
FDI
Country share in 
Realized FDI (%)
Austria 6 31,22 67 1,43
Belgium 6 77,67 19,22 3,57
Canada 1 51 51 2,34
Denmark 5 88,62 47,16 4,07
France 8 241,94 43,68 11,11
Germany 24 326,76 46,61 15,01
Italy 6 289,06 42,7 13,28
Japan 1 80 40 3,67
Kuwait 1 64,8 40 2,98
Netherlands 6 122,51 66,31 5,63
Sweden 2 4,96 22,53 0,23
Switzerland 13 247,36 56,48 11,36
UK 5 62,17 41,37 2,86
USA 20 396 28,85 18,19
Venezuela 1 4,5 100 0,21
Unified 5 88,86 41,66 4,08
TOTAL 109 2177,42 40,19|
Source: Türkiye'de Yabanci Sermaye. State Planning Organization, (1983), 13.
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Table 5: Source Country Distribution of FDI Stocks, 1979
(in million TL)
Source Country I 
1
“dumber of i 
Firms ]
f\.uthorized
FDI
Realized
FDI
Country share in 
Realized FDI
(%)
Austria 2 3,7 34,26 0,15
Belgium 2 9,1 67,41 0,36
Canada 1 51 51 2,03
Denmark 4 39,9 24,8 1,58
Finland 1 34,7 61,96 1,38
France 6 426,1 44,9 16,92
Germany 23 386,34 46,59 15,34
Italy 5 257,65 40,24 10,23
Japan 2 19 40 0,75
Kuwait 1 64,8 60,64 2,57
Netherlands 6 106,9 25 4,24
Sweden 2 5,5 63,86 0,22
Switzerland 7 252,3 43,92 10,02
UK 5 81,3 47,64 3,23
USA 13 323,36 13,39 12,84
Unified
Intemat. Institut.
5 281,39 9,05 11,17
6 175,44 29,7 6,97
TOTAL 91 2518,48 40,19 100
Source: Türkiye'de Yabanci Sermaye, State Planning Organization, (1983'), 
Table 6: The Ratios of FDI to GNP between 1968 and 1979
Year Annual FDI 
Inflow
Annual
GNP
FDI/ GNP 
Ratios
1
($ million) ($ million) (%)
1968 13,9 18050 0,00077
1969 13,2; 20193 0,00065
1970 Ç1 19031 0,00047
1971 110' 17244 0,00068
1972 12,1; 21968 0,00058
1973 67,2) 27947 0,00241
1974 -7,2  ^ 38242 -0,00020
1975 15,1[ 47452: 0,00032
1976 8,() 5368^l· 0,00017
1977 9,:1 6126*1 0,00015
1978 i i ; 7 66828 0,00018
1979 -6,^ 8169fi -0,00008
The ratio calculations are made by using FDI and GNP data.
Sources: Turkey Main Economic Indicators. State Planning Organization,(1987), 10. 
Gross National Product: Concepts. Methods, and Sources. State Institute of 
Statistics, (1994), 67.
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APPENDIX D
Table 1: Value of Exports of Selected Latin American Countries in Selected Years 
Between 1979 and 1988 (Millions of Dollars)
Countries 1970 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Argentina 1173 2961 7813 8020 9143 7626 7835 8107 8396 6852 6360 9135
Brazil 2739 8670 15244 20132 23680 20213 21899 27005 25639 22376 26225 33787
Chile 1234 1552 3894 4671 3906 3710 3836 3657 3823 4222 5102 7048
Mexico 1311 2992 8818 15301 20041 17916 20634 24196 21644 16031 20656 20658
Colonmbia 736 1465 3300 3945 2956 3095 3081 3483 3552 5102 4642 4873
Peru 1065 1291 3676 3916 3249 3227 3027 3131 2705 2467 2626 2672
Sources :Trade and Development Report, 1987. UNCTAD (Paris: UN Publications, 1987),4. 
Trade and Development Report. 1989. UNCTAD (Paris: Un Publications, 1989), 4.
Table 2: Latin America: Trade in Manufacturers by Major Regions of Originand 
Destination, 1970-1990 (Percentage Share)
Exports Imports
Origin/Destination 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990
World 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Developed Market 
Economies of which:
54,2 46,0 66,5 88,0 83,1 79,6
Western Europe 18,3 18,5 17,1 37,8 29,8 26,5
USA 31,3 21,9 43,3 38,2 38,6 41,2
Developing Countries 
of which:
44,3 51,6 31,7 7,1 12,6 15,4
Latin America 41,7 44,0 22,2 6,0 9,6 9,5
Source :Trade and Development Report. 1994. UNCTA 
21.
D (Paris: UN Publications, 1994),
Table 3: Export GDP Ratios of Selected Latin American Countries in Selected Years 
(Percentages)
Countries 1980 1985 1990 1992
Argentina 5,1 11,7 10,4 6,6
Brazil 9,1 12,2 7,2 10
Chile 22,8 29,1 36,5 33,4
Colombia 16,2 13,8 20,4 21,2
Mexico 10,7 15,4 15,8 13,6
Peru 13,7 15,3 14,6 13,5
Venezuela 28,8 25 39,4 25,5
Source: David Felix, “Industrial Development in East Asia: What are The Lessons for Latin 
America?,” UNCTAD, Discussion Papers No: 84 (May 1994), 23.
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Table 4: Commodity and Geographical Structure of Exports from Latin America in 1990 
(Percentage Distribution)
Region Food
Agricultural
Raw
Materials
Ores and 
Metals
Fuels Manufacturers Total
Exports
World 27,0 3,3 11,4 26,5 30,8 100,0
Developed Market 
Economies of which:
28,1 3,5 14,0 21,0 32,6 100,0
Western Europe 41,6 5,0 19,1 10,0 23,3 100,0
USA 20,1 2,1 6,5 29,9 40,9 100,0
Developing Countries 
of which:
25,8 4,6 9,6 12,1 47,6 100,0
Latin America 22,1 4,2 7,0 16,3 50,2 100,0
Source :Trade and Development Report. 1994. UNCTAD (Paris; UN Publications, 1994), 
21.
Table 5: Annual Average of Net EDI of Selected Latin American Countries in Selected 
Periods (billion dollars)
Countries in 
selected periods 
(billion dollars)
1980-
1981
1982-
1985
1986-
1989
1990 1991 1992-
1995
1996
Argentina 0,9 0,4 0,7 2,0 2,4 3,2 2,0
Brazil 1,9 1,7 1,2 0,2 1,66 1,66 5,5
Chile 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,6 1,3 2,2
Mexico 2,5 0,7 2,6 2,6 4,8 5,3 6,4
Venezulela 0,1 0,1 -0,1 0,4 1,9 0,5 1,4
Sources -.Trade and Development Report. 1993. UNCTAD (Paris: UN Publications, 1993), 
55.
Trade and Development Report. 1994. UNCTAD (Paris: UN Publications, 1994), 14,30, 96- 
106.
Trade and Development Report. 1996. UNCTAD (Paris: UN Publications, 1996), 14,30- 
39,75-86.
Trade and Development Report. 1997. UNCTAD (Paris: UN Publications, 1997), 14,25- 
37,90-98.
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Table 6: External Trade of MERCOSUR, 1988-1994 
(Million USD and Percentage)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Total Exports 
(USD)
44829 46555 46333 45911 50847 54085 62027
Intra-
MERCOSUR
Exports(%)
6,5 8,2 8,9 11,1 14,3 18,6 19,3
Total Imports 
(USD)
23076 26061 29302 34264 40649 48509 62422
Intra-
MERCOSUR
Import(%)
13,3 15,1 14,5 15,5 18,4 19,6 19,6
Source: Magnus Blomstrom and Ari Kokko, “How Foreign Investment Affects Host
Countries,” The World Bank International Economics Department Development 
Data Group and International Finance Division,Policy Research Working Paper 
No: 1745 (March 1997),34.
Table?: FDI Flows of Developed Countries, 1981-1990 
(Billion Dollars)
Years Outward Inward
% changes of
Outward Inward
1981 46 32
1982 18 22 -0,61 -0,31
1983 23 23 0,28 0,05
1984 31 31 0,35 0,35
1985 50 27 0,61 -0,13
1986 86 64 0,72 1,37
1987 135 108 0,57 0,69
1988 161 129 0,19 0,19
1989 201 165 0,25 0,28
1990 217 152 0,08 -0,08
1981-1985 168 134 -0,23 -0,12
1986-1990 800 618 3,76 3,61
Percentage changes are calculated from outward and inward flows.
Source: Edward M Graham and Paul R. Knigman, “The Surge in FDI in The 1980s,” 
Foreign Direct Investment, ed. Kenneth A. Froot (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1993), 18.
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Table 8: Rates of Growth of Real GDP of Latin American Countries Between 1968-1992 
(Percentage)
1968-72 1973-77 1978-82 1983-87 1988-92
Argentina 3,1 2,1 -0,6 0,9 3,0
Brazil 8,2 6,8 2,7 6,2 -0,5
Chile 3,7 -1,0 2,4 4,7 6,3
Colombia 6,4 4,0 3,1 4,3 3,2
Mexico 6,1 4,7 6,3 0,7 3,6
Peru 5,6 3,0 3,7 6,0 -3,6
Urugay 2,0 3,7 1,5 4,5 2,8
Venezuela 4,8 6,8 -0,3 2,9 4,7
Source: Manuel R., Agosin "Saving and Investment in Latin America," UNCTAD, 
Discussion Papers No; 90 (October 1994), 17.
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